A bus burns on a highway, a railway station is stripped, a municipal office is set alight, and the next morning the argument begins. One side says the agitation was a legitimate cry of grievance that a few hooligans hijacked. The other side says the cost of every such night is borne by a taxpayer who never joined the march. Both are partly right, and neither answers the question that matters to a state governed by law: who pays, who decides, and by what procedure? My argument in this blog is that those who call for and lead violent agitation should bear the cost of damage to public property, but that the bill must be raised through a fair, independent and judicial process, not through the discretion of an executive officer.
What the statute provides on damage to public property
India has had a dedicated law since 1984. The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 defines public property widely: movable or immovable property owned by, or in the possession or control of, the Central or a State Government, a local authority, a statutory corporation or a government company. Under Section 3(1), mischief causing damage to such property is punishable with imprisonment of up to five years and a fine. Section 3(2) singles out installations for water, light, power or energy, oil, sewage, mines and factories, and public transport and telecommunications, with rigorous imprisonment of not less than six months, extendable to five years, and a fine. Where the damage is done by fire or an explosive substance, Section 4 prescribes rigorous imprisonment of at least one year and up to ten years. Section 5 adds a restraint on bail: a person in custody cannot be released unless the prosecution has had a chance to oppose it.
This is a criminal law. It punishes the person who strikes the match. It does not, by itself, say who pays the bill, and it is silent on the harder case of the organiser who calls the crowd out and then disappears.
The gap the Supreme Court filled in 2009
That gap was the subject of In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 5 SCC 212. The Court took up the matter on its own motion after large-scale damage during bandhs and hartals. Two committees recommended that organisers and participants be prosecuted, that electronic evidence be used, and that Parliament amend the law. As later summarised by the Court, it then issued interim guidelines to operate until a law was framed. Under them, a High Court or the Supreme Court may act suo motu, set up investigating machinery and award compensation, with an assessor if necessary. Once damage in a direct action is proved and the accused took part in it, guilt may be presumed, subject to rebuttal. Leaders of an organisation that called the action may be presumed to have abetted the offence, but a leader is not liable if he shows he had no connection with the call or took all reasonable measures to prevent the damage.
This is a careful design. It does not hold a political party liable for every stone thrown by a stranger. It lifts the burden of proof only where the leader called the action, and it gives him an exit.
Eight years of waiting, then another push
The law the Court wanted did not follow. In Koshy Jacob v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 55 of 2013, decided on 28 November 2017 by Adarsh Kumar Goel and Uday Umesh Lalit, JJ., the petitioner, an advocate, had spent more than twelve hours stuck on a road after surgery because of an agitation. The order records that eight years after the 2009 guidelines, no legislation had been enacted; the Union said it was amending the 1984 Act and had published a draft. The Attorney General told the Court that a mechanism was needed “to fix accountability”, including for failures to act. The Court could not direct Parliament to legislate, so it expressed the hope that the proposed law would come into force in reasonable time and noted a suggestion that States appoint district judges, full-time or part-time, to hear damage claims.
Less than a year later, in Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 330 of 2018, decided on 1 October 2018 (Dipak Misra, C.J., A.M. Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.), the Court extended the Tehseen Poonawalla framework of preventive, remedial and punitive measures to peaceful protests that turn violent. It recorded that leaders and office-bearers of a group that staged a violent protest must present themselves to the police within twenty-four hours, or be treated as suspects. Persons arrested may be granted conditional bail on depositing the quantified loss or furnishing security, with several accused “jointly, severally and vicariously” liable, the amount being provisional and subject to final determination. FIRs were to be filed and investigations completed in time, and unexplained delay was to count as dereliction of duty. The Court asked that its directions be implemented within eight weeks.
The Uttar Pradesh lesson
The strongest argument for procedure comes from our own State. After agitations against the citizenship law in December 2019, Uttar Pradesh issued recovery notices to alleged participants. The matter reached the Supreme Court in Parwaiz Arif Titu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, W.P. (Civil) No. 55 of 2020. On 18 February 2022, the State told the Court it had withdrawn the notices, reported as 274, by orders dated 14 and 15 February 2022. The bench criticised the State for starting recoveries by executive orders with Additional District Magistrates as adjudicators. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud said that claims must be decided by independent tribunals headed by judicially trained persons, and Justice Surya Kant asked whether the State had become “the complainant, the prosecutor and the adjudicator”. The Court directed that recoveries already made be refunded, without prejudice to fresh proceedings before the claims tribunals the State’s 2020 law had created. Justice Chandrachud added that the Court had not barred claims for damage to public property, but “you have to follow due process of law”.
The lesson is not that the State was wrong to want its money. It is that a recovery which skips the independent judge invites a refund order, a headline and, worse, public sympathy for the person who actually broke the law.
The strongest counter-argument
The best objection comes from those who fear that liability for damage will become a weapon against movements. A leader, they say, cannot control a crowd; a presumption of abetment puts the burden on the person with fewer resources; and a government hostile to a movement will pick its targets. There is substance here. Collective financial liability is a blunt instrument, and the temptation to use it selectively is real.
Yet the 2009 guidelines already answer the objection in part. They do not impose liability on anyone merely for taking part in a lawful protest. They apply where the leader called a direct action that resulted in damage, and they spare the leader who proves he had no connection with the call or took every reasonable step to prevent harm. The proper remedy for misuse is therefore what the Uttar Pradesh case demanded: an independent tribunal, reasoned findings, and appeal. It is not the abandonment of recovery. A republic that never sends the bill to the organiser sends it to the shopkeeper, the commuter and the taxpayer.
The State also pays
One more party belongs in the account. The Attorney General’s own submission in Koshy Jacob accepted that accountability had to be fixed for failures to act, and Kodungallur treated unexplained police delay in FIRs and investigations as dereliction of duty. If the administration knew of a call and did nothing to prevent it, it too should answer. Responsibility that runs only downward, from crowd to street, is not accountability; it is convenience.
Conclusion
The rule of law asks three things of the burning street. It asks that the person who struck the match be punished under the 1984 Act. It asks that the person who called the crowd and abandoned it be made to pay through an independent tribunal, after a fair hearing. And it asks that the State answer for its own lapses. Parliament should give these principles a settled statute rather than leave them to interim guidelines, more than sixteen years after they were first written.
Frequently asked questions
What does the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 provide?
Section 3(1) punishes mischief causing damage to public property with up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine. Section 3(2) covers installations such as power, water and transport, and Section 4 provides one to ten years where fire or explosives are used.
What did the Supreme Court decide in 2009 on destruction of public property?
In In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties, (2009) 5 SCC 212, it issued interim guidelines until a law was framed. Leaders of an organisation that called a violent action may be presumed to have abetted the offence, unless they show they had no connection with the call or took all reasonable measures to prevent damage.
Why did the Supreme Court criticise Uttar Pradesh’s recovery notices?
In Parwaiz Arif Titu the bench criticised the State for starting recoveries by executive orders with Additional District Magistrates as adjudicators. The Court said claims must be decided by independent tribunals, and directed refunds of recoveries already made.
Should the State also be accountable?
The article argues yes: the Attorney General accepted in Koshy Jacob that accountability had to be fixed for failures to act, and Kodungallur treated unexplained police delay as dereliction of duty.
Further reading from AFPR: The Grammar of Dissent: Why the Constitution Sends Protest to Institutions, Not the Street · Petition, Not Placard: Why the Street Cannot Stand In for the Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Constitution
Notes and References
1. Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, ss. 2 to 5 (summary of text). BnB Legal, bare act page. https://bnblegal.com/bareact/prevention-damage-public-property-act-1984/
2. In Re: Destruction of Public and Private Properties v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 5 SCC 212. Described in Koshy Jacob v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 55 of 2013, Supreme Court, order of 28 November 2017. https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2013/1432/1432_2013_Judgement_28-Nov-2017.pdf
3. Kodungallur Film Society v. Union of India, W.P. (Civil) No. 330 of 2018, Supreme Court, judgment of 1 October 2018. https://api.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2018/3158/3158_2018_Judgement_01-Oct-2018.pdf
4. LiveLaw, “Supreme Court’s Criticism: UP Govt Withdraws Recovery Notices Issued to Anti-CAA Protesters, Directs Refund of Recoveries”, 18 February 2022 (Parwaiz Arif Titu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, W.P. (Civil) No. 55 of 2020). https://livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-courts-criticism-up-govt-withdraws-recovery-notices-issued-anti-caa-protesters-directs-refund-recoveries-192249



