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States in Competition: Federalism, Markets and the Race to Reform

Competition among India’s states has paid, but only where it improves the conditions for enterprise rather than bidding up concessions.

States in Competition: Federalism, Markets and the Race to Reform

The Race And The Wrong Scoreboard

India’s investment summits, a showcase of competitive federalism, resemble contests for the next factory, campus or corridor. Chief ministers announce commitments, compare rankings and promise investors faster approvals and cheaper infrastructure. Yet the largest investment announcement does not necessarily signify the greatest economic gain. An announcement is not a factory, a subsidy is not productivity and an industrial project is not automatically a public benefit.

Industrial success looks different depending on the measure used. Maharashtra leads in registered manufacturing value added, while Tamil Nadu leads in factory sector employment. Karnataka’s strength in attracting foreign equity reflects an economic structure different from Gujarat’s concentration of industrial production. None of these outcomes can be reduced to a single league table. Each captures something useful but none establishes that citizens have received value proportionate to the public resources committed.

On balance, competition among states has benefited India but its value depends on how they compete. States can learn from successful neighbours, simplify procedures and develop capabilities that a distant central authority might overlook. The same rivalry can also encourage increasingly generous concessions for projects that would have been established somewhere in India anyway. The first approach can expand collective prosperity; the second may merely redistribute bargaining gains towards investors.

This article asks a harder question than which state tops the investment rankings: what constitutes a truly meaningful victory for competitive federalism? The answer requires examining constitutional space, measurable economic results, subsidy costs and the safeguards that make growth worthwhile.

The Constitutional Space For Competitive Federalism

India’s Constitution creates neither a unitary economic administration nor an unrestricted marketplace of state governments. Article 246 distributes legislative responsibilities across Union, State and Concurrent Lists, giving states substantial authority over areas shaping local economic conditions. Land administration, aspects of industry, infrastructure and public services influence investment decisions even where central legislation establishes a common regulatory framework. This diversity makes comparison, experimentation, policy learning and accountability to local communities possible.

Taxation demonstrates both the autonomy and its limits. Article 246A authorises the Union and states to legislate on goods and services tax, while Article 279A establishes the GST Council as a forum for collective decision making. In Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, the Supreme Court recognised that Council recommendations are not, by their constitutional character alone, binding commands to the legislatures. Federalism therefore accommodates negotiation and disagreement; it does not assume that cooperation abolishes independent democratic choice. Statutory obligations remain enforceable on their own terms.

The freedom-of-trade provisions supply another boundary. Articles 301 to 304 protect the national economic space while permitting constitutionally justified regulation. In Jindal Stainless v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court distinguished impermissible discriminatory protectionism from legitimate differentiation, including measures addressing uneven development. A state’s preference for industrial development is not automatically unconstitutional. Whether a particular measure crosses a constitutional line depends on its design, effect and applicable law.

These principles complicate both simple prescriptions. Uniformity could suppress useful experimentation, while unconstrained rivalry could undermine the common market and equality before law. Nor does judicial recognition of state autonomy amount to an endorsement of every subsidy. Governments remain subject to statutory competence, non-arbitrariness, environmental law and their fiscal responsibilities.

The constitutional task is consequently not to decide whether states may compete at all. It is to identify competition that permits regional strategies without sacrificing public obligations for private investment.

When Competition Improves Governance

The affirmative case for competition begins not with incentives but with institutions. An investor deciding where to build needs predictable land records, timely electricity connections, usable roads, enforceable contracts and officials who interpret rules consistently. Improvements in these services can benefit existing enterprises and new entrants alike. When one state removes needless procedural delays, others face pressure to explain why comparable improvements remain unavailable to their own residents.

Evidence suggests this mechanism can matter economically. The International Monetary Fund’s analysis of India’s Business Reform Action Plan found that a one percentage point increase in reform implementation was associated, in its preferred instrumental variable specification, with approximately 0.4% higher manufacturing total factor productivity. Productivity is a relevant measure because it concerns how effectively inputs become output, rather than merely how much capital arrives. The estimate, however, depends on assumptions about the research design and is not a guaranteed return from any individual reform.

NITI Aayog’s Investment Friendliness Index 2026 reinforces the diversity of relevant conditions. Gujarat led the selected large states with a score of 56.6, followed by Maharashtra at 53.7 and Tamil Nadu at 53.3. The index considers infrastructure, business climate, resources, regulation, public policy, institutions, financial health and environmental resilience. Its value lies partly in showing that states display different strengths. Yet a composite score cannot determine which reform caused new investment, still less whether a particular subsidy was justified.

Reform competition differs from concession competition. Digitising approvals may reduce recurring costs for thousands of firms, including small businesses. A tailored tax or land concession may chiefly benefit one company. The former can build economic capacity; the latter requires public returns commensurate with its cost.

Regulatory quality also differs from indiscriminate deregulation. Quick decisions have little value if permits are unpredictable, disputes remain unresolved or basic protections disappear. A credible state offers certainty about both approvals and compliance. It can shorten administrative queues while preserving inspections where hazards demand them; it can improve access to industrial land without concealing title disputes or displacing affected communities without lawful safeguards.

Reform therefore succeeds when it changes the conditions under which businesses operate, not merely their initial bargaining position. The challenge is to measure whether that improvement translates into activity on the ground, rather than accept the promise of investment as its own proof.

From Investment Promises To Factory Floors

The gap between commitments and outcomes is easiest to see when different investment statistics are placed beside one another. DPIIT recorded approximately ₹5.17 lakh crore in foreign direct investment equity inflows during financial year 2025–26. Maharashtra received ₹1,61,892 crore and Karnataka ₹1,12,870 crore, together accounting for just over half the national total. Such concentration matters but foreign equity includes transactions that do not create a new factory. Its geographical attribution should not be mistaken for a verified map of where every rupee of productive expenditure occurred.

Another official series tracks implementation. Under the Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum system, Part A records industrial intentions while Part B is filed upon commencement of commercial production. For the period up to December 2025, DPIIT recorded 998 Part B filings representing reported investment of approximately ₹5.83 lakh crore. Gujarat accounted for 230 filings and ₹2,46,595 crore of that investment. These reports offer stronger evidence of projects reaching an operational milestone than investment summit declarations. They remain enterprise filings, however, not independent measurements of subsequent output, utilisation or permanent employment.

The figures also cannot be turned into a simple national conversion rate. Projects beginning production in a given year may have announced or registered their intentions much earlier. Coverage also changes with eligibility thresholds. The IEM threshold rose in April 2025, affecting which projects enter the series. Dividing one year’s completed filings by that year’s intentions would therefore mix different cohorts and produce an impressive but misleading percentage.

Maharashtra illustrates another reporting problem. Its Economic Survey describes 303 Magnetic Maharashtra memoranda of understanding between June 2020 and October 2025, valued at ₹26.88 lakh crore and associated with commitments of 26.69 lakh jobs. The same survey reports eligibility certificates for 912 mega projects approved under a different programme over a much longer period. Different programmes, stages and timeframes preclude subtracting these totals to measure fulfilment. Each commitment must instead be tracked through construction, production and verified payroll.

Semiconductors supply a contemporary test. By 17 September 2026, the Union government reported five operational commercial semiconductor ATMP units among twelve approved units under Semicon 1.0. The remaining approvals were not necessarily failures. Fabs and advanced packaging facilities demand different technology, financing and construction schedules. Equally, an approved fabrication plant must not be described as already manufacturing chips. The evidence calls for milestone reporting, not automatic celebration or premature scepticism.

A credible investment scoreboard would therefore distinguish announced value, approved capacity, verified expenditure, commencement of production and performance after operations begin. It would separately identify new investment and changes in ownership and would follow projects over a common period rather than combine unrelated statistics. Comparable project-level reporting would recognise achievements better than record-breaking summit totals. Only then can we ask a further question: what did governments pay to secure those investments?

The Price Of Winning Investment

India’s semiconductor policies reveal competitive federalism at its most ambitious and financially demanding. The Union offers qualifying projects assistance covering up to half of eligible capital costs. States then compete with additional support, often supplemented by concessions on land, electricity, stamp duties and infrastructure. These packages pursue a legitimate strategic objective of establishing advanced manufacturing capabilities in an industry characterised by enormous fixed costs, complex supply chains and substantial technological risk.

Yet policy design differs materially across states. Gujarat’s original semiconductor framework offered additional assistance tied to 40% of central capital support for qualifying projects, alongside substantial land and power concessions. Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh provided frameworks allowing specified projects state assistance tied to as much as half of central capital support, subject to conditions. Odisha has revised its semiconductor policy repeatedly, including differentiated provisions for early projects and supply chain segments. Quoting an old headline percentage without checking amendments, caps and categories risks misrepresenting the actual offer.

The arithmetic explains the attraction. Where central support covers half of an identical eligible cost base and state assistance equals half that central support, the two nominal contributions together could reach three-quarters of that cost. This is only an illustrative ceiling: eligibility, exclusions, milestones, approvals and overlapping rules determine actual payment. Concessional land and utilities may also impose public costs that never appear in the quoted percentage. Transparent public evaluation must price land concessions against alternative uses and account for costs shifted through discounted electricity.

A large subsidy can nevertheless be rational. Early investors may create specialised supplier networks, train workers, transfer expertise and reduce risks for subsequent entrants. Where those spillovers cannot be fully captured by the initial investor, public support may unlock national benefits exceeding the subsidy. Semiconductor production may also have strategic value beyond immediate commercial returns. Dismissing every incentive as corporate favouritism would disregard these possibilities.

The harder issue is additionality. Would the investment have occurred without the incentive? Would the project have come to India but selected another Indian state? Does assistance purchase new national capacity or merely finance a change of address? Firms negotiating simultaneously with multiple governments may exploit competition even when the underlying commercial location is already favourable. Meanwhile, financially stronger states can offer concessions that poorer states cannot match, reinforcing the advantages that made them attractive initially.

These questions cannot be answered by comparing advertised subsidy rates. They require credible estimates of the alternative investment scenario, actual disbursements, related infrastructure costs and measurable spillovers. Public agreements should specify performance conditions without revealing genuinely protected commercial information. Authorities should explain why the expected employment, technology or regional benefit warrants the committed resources, then independently evaluate whether it materialises. Negotiated conditions also matter. A subsidy linked to measurable training and supplier development has a different economic character from an unconditional payment made merely because a firm promises investment.

The point is not to forbid industrial policy. It is to shift the burden of justification from the size of an announced investment to the additional value taxpayers purchase. Without that discipline, competitive federalism risks rewarding the government willing to pay most, rather than the location capable of generating the greatest productive return.

Growth For Whom?

Capital investment is an intermediate objective. Its democratic justification rests partly on what it does for people whose labour, taxes and local environments support industrial expansion. A new plant may raise output while employing relatively few workers. A labour-intensive industry may create numerous jobs without providing comparable wages or security. Evaluating state competition therefore requires more than counting factories.

The Annual Survey of Industries 2024–25 estimated 2.10 crore persons engaged in registered manufacturing, an increase of 7.19% over the preceding year. Contrasting state patterns show why quantity and remuneration should be examined together. Tamil Nadu accounted for 14.99% of persons engaged but 13.02% of total emoluments. Maharashtra accounted for 13.08% of persons engaged and 17.64% of emoluments. Expressed relative to the national average, those shares imply notably different average remuneration per person engaged.

These aggregates cover different occupations and industries; they neither compare pay for equivalent work nor adjust for local living costs. They reveal variation in industrial structures, not a ranking of workers’ welfare.

Nationally, average annual wages per worker calculated from ASI totals rose from roughly ₹2.16 lakh to ₹2.28 lakh between the two surveys, a nominal increase of about 5.34%. These figures are unadjusted for inflation, hours worked and earnings distribution. Higher wages can coexist with precarious contracts, unsafe workplaces and limited opportunities for women and marginalised communities. Pay should be assessed alongside social protection, safety standards, bargaining rights and contract duration.

Broader labour market data underline another distinction. Regular wage and salaried employment represent different proportions of total employment across states but these shares include services, agriculture and other activities. They cannot substitute for manufacturing-specific evidence or prove that industrial policies caused differences in job security.

Distribution matters geographically as well. Capital tends to prefer existing clusters where suppliers, roads, skilled workers and finance already converge. Successful clusters can generate further growth but concentrating all new support there may leave aspiring industrial regions dependent on transfers or migration.

Uttar Pradesh makes the regional choice concrete. Under its 2022 industrial investment policy, stamp-duty exemption increases from 50% in Gautam Buddh Nagar and Ghaziabad to 100% in Bundelkhand and Poorvanchal. For qualifying large projects choosing the capital-subsidy option, the base rate similarly rises from 10 to 15% of eligible capital investment, payable over ten years and adjusted for capacity utilisation. These differentiated incentives seek to attract industry beyond established clusters. Their success must ultimately be judged by sustained production, local employment and supplier development rather than the generosity of the offer.

The relevant question is not whether every state should reproduce the same employment structure. It is whether competition expands the range of decent, sustainable opportunities available to residents. A policy producing impressive factory output but little local learning, secure employment or regional inclusion deserves a more qualified verdict than an investment ranking permits.

The Costs Beyond The Balance Sheet

Investment incentives compete with other claims on public resources. Maharashtra reported disbursing ₹5,700 crore under its Package Scheme of Incentives in 2023–24 and ₹5,600 crore in 2024–25. A further ₹3,840 crore was disbursed up to October of the following financial year. These payments exclude foregone revenue, discounted land and project-specific infrastructure. Without consolidated reporting, legislators may miss obligations not reflected in public debt figures when agreements are signed.

National semiconductor accounts illustrate the importance of timing. The central scheme recorded ₹638 crore in actual expenditure during 2024–25, despite substantially larger allocations for later years. Allocations are not disbursements: milestone-based payments may follow years after approval. Counting allocations as expenditure overstates current costs; ignoring commitments understates future liabilities.

Fiscal capacity is unequal to begin with. States with stronger tax bases can fund infrastructure and incentives more easily than states facing heavy service needs and limited revenue. The 16th Finance Commission retained the states’ collective share of the divisible Union tax pool at 41% while assigning a weight to contribution to GDP within its horizontal distribution formula. That design reflects the continuing challenge of recognising economic contribution while pursuing equitable fiscal transfers. Investment competition operates within this structural tension and can intensify it.

There are also costs that budgets do not adequately describe. A factory’s electricity reliability, water use and pollution controls depend upon public regulators with sufficient staff and independence. The Comptroller and Auditor General found that Maharashtra’s pollution control authority completed 74,163 of 1,88,336 scheduled industrial inspections during 2017–23. The substantial shortfall reflects a problem of enforcement capacity. It does not demonstrate that investor competition caused the shortfall. Staffing constraints and administrative demands also require explanation.

The same audit raised questions about environmental compensation notices worth ₹183.25 crore issued to defaulting industries and subsequently withdrawn without, in the auditor’s assessment, sufficient justification. Whether particular sums remain legally recoverable today is a separate question. The institutional lesson is clear. Announcing protective rules is different from consistently enforcing them and the public bears risks when enforcement becomes uncertain.

Nor should regulatory simplification be equated with automatic abandonment of safeguards. Odisha amended its semiconductor framework to retain regular inspections for hazardous facilities while allowing different compliance arrangements for qualifying lower risk activities. This distinction shows how investor facilitation can coexist with risk-based oversight, provided statutory protections and effective complaint mechanisms remain intact.

A meaningful evaluation must therefore include opportunity costs and external effects alongside capital expenditure. The public value of an industrial project is diminished if its financial advantages depend on neglected schools, inadequate public services or unremedied environmental damage. These trade-offs demand evidence rather than presumption but excluding them from the competition itself prejudges the answer. Strong safeguards can themselves be an economic asset, preserving community consent and reducing the costly disputes that often delay industrial projects.

Designing A Fairer Race To Reform

A fairer system would reward results without suppressing competition. Major incentive packages could carry standardised public records of expenditure, foregone revenue, infrastructure support and milestones, followed by data on operating investment, employment, pay and compliance.

Before approving support, governments should identify the market failure or regional disadvantage justifying intervention and publish that rationale alongside the decision. After implementation, independent assessment should, wherever feasible, compare supported projects with credible alternatives and test whether claimed benefits exceed public costs. A project that would have proceeded without assistance does not justify the same subsidy as one delivering otherwise unattainable capability.

These safeguards, however, carry costs of their own. Elaborate disclosure requirements, speculative additionality tests and open-ended clawbacks may delay investment and expand bureaucratic discretion. There is also a serious argument that fiscal centralisation, rather than interstate rivalry, poses the greater threat to state autonomy and India’s common market. That concern deserves weight. Accountability should not become another clearance regime: states must remain free to choose their incentives, subject to transparent conditions fixed in advance, proportionate remedies for defined breaches and evaluation of results after implementation.

Support can then be linked to verifiable performance. Milestone payments, time-limited concessions, proportionate clawback provisions and periodic legislative scrutiny would discourage exaggerated projections without penalising firms for risks beyond their control. Commercial confidentiality warrants protection but should not conceal the cost and broad public conditions of assistance. Environmental and labour compliance must remain substantive obligations rather than negotiable benefits.

Legal predictability matters as much as economic measurement. In State of Jharkhand v. Brahmputra Metallics, the Supreme Court addressed arbitrary frustration of a publicly announced industrial concession. That principle favours transparent and lawful implementation, not unexamined generosity. A state should neither promise benefits casually nor withdraw them capriciously.

National reporting need not restrict state autonomy. Shared definitions and multiyear evaluations should distinguish pledged jobs from payroll records, acknowledge uncertainty about subsidy effects and make results accessible locally. States would still choose their industries and development paths, while citizens could assess outcomes. Competition would become less about winning announcements and more about earning durable public trust.

Conclusion: Compete To Improve, Not Undercut

India benefits when states experiment, improve administration and demonstrate that public institutions can enable productive enterprise. Competition becomes suspect not because governments seek investment but because the race can reward expensive promises without requiring equally visible results. Industrial commitments, factory operations, wages, public expenditure and regulatory enforcement are different questions. A credible assessment must keep them distinct before judging their relationship.

On balance, interstate competition has been good for India, especially where it improves the conditions for enterprise rather than bidding up concessions. Its limit is reached when taxpayers purchase little additional national capacity at substantial public expense. That does not justify centralising industrial choices or imposing new layers of discretionary approval. States require room to innovate, while citizens deserve a clear account of public costs and the enforcement of conditions agreed in advance.

The objective should not be a federation where every state offers the same package or pursues the same industries. It should be one where competition raises standards rather than lowers obligations. The winning state is not necessarily the one that attracts the biggest promise but the one that can demonstrate the greatest enduring public value.

Frequently asked questions

What is competitive federalism in India?
It is the competition among states to attract investment by improving administration and offering incentives. The article argues it has benefited India, but that its value depends on how states compete.

Does the Constitution allow states to compete for investment?
Yes. Article 246 gives states substantial legislative authority, and in Jindal Stainless v. State of Haryana the Supreme Court distinguished impermissible protectionism from legitimate differentiation. A state’s preference for industrial development is not automatically unconstitutional.

Why are investment announcements a poor scoreboard?
An announcement is not a factory and a subsidy is not productivity. A credible scoreboard would separate announced value, approved capacity, verified expenditure and the commencement of production.

How can the race to reform be made fairer?
Through public records of incentive costs, milestone payments, proportionate clawbacks and independent evaluation of results. States would still choose their own incentives, subject to conditions fixed in advance.

Further reading from AFPR: The UP Turnaround: Evaluating Uttar Pradesh’s Growth Trajectory

References

Table of cases

Jindal Stainless Ltd v State of Haryana (2017) 12 SCC 1

State of Jharkhand v Brahmputra Metallics Ltd (2023) 10 SCC 634

Union of India v Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd (2022) 10 SCC 700

Legislation

Constitution of India 1950

Reports, government publications and policy documents

Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report on Compliance and Performance Audit—Civil for the Period Ended March 2023, Government of Maharashtra (Report No 8 of 2025, 2026) https://saiindia.gov.in/en/audit-report/details/124899

Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, Annual Report 2025–26 (Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2026) https://www.dpiit.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/03/863a5fef349d79a1bba316c4b51eaacb.pdf

Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, ‘FDI Equity Inflow: April 2025 to March 2026’ (Government of India, June 2026) https://www.dpiit.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/06/44c824a7356879590d21ac1a1c4beac7.pdf

Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Maharashtra, Economic Survey of Maharashtra 2025–26 (2026) https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s349d4b2faeb4b7b9e745775793141e2b2/uploads/2026/10/202610151773411968.pdf

Government of Gujarat, Department of Science and Technology, Gujarat Semiconductor Policy (2022–27) (Government Resolution No DST/OTM/e-File/24/2021/0004/IT, 27 July 2022) https://dst.gujarat.gov.in/Home/GujaratSemiconductorPolicy

Government of Odisha, Electronics and Information Technology Department, ‘Second Amendment of Odisha Semiconductor Manufacturing & Fabless Policy – 2023’ (Resolution No 4192, 1 August 2025) Odisha Gazette No 4603 (28 October 2025) https://it.odisha.gov.in/sites/default/files/2026-01/4603-E%26IT%20Deptt.pdf

Government of Tamil Nadu, Industries, Investment Promotion and Commerce Department, Tamil Nadu Semiconductor and Advanced Electronics Policy 2024 (2024) https://storage.investingintamilnadu.com/Guidance/Uploads/Others/scp_2024.pdf

Government of Uttar Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh Industrial Investment and Employment Promotion Policy 2022 (2022) https://invest.up.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Uttar_Pradesh_Industrial_Investment_Employment_Promotion_Policy_2022-en.pdf

Government of Uttar Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh Semiconductor Policy 2024 (2024) https://invest.up.gov.in/uttar-pradesh-semiconductor-policy-2024/

International Monetary Fund, India: 2025 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for India (IMF Country Report No 25/314, November 2025) https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/002/2025/314/article-A001-en.xml

Ministry of Commerce and Industry, ‘Revision in Eligibility Criteria for Industrial Entrepreneurs Memorandum (IEM) Acknowledgement’ (Press Information Bureau, 3 April 2025) https://www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2118292

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, ‘Cabinet Approves Modifications in “Programme for Development of Semiconductors and Display Manufacturing Ecosystem in India”’ (Press Information Bureau, 21 September 2022) https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1861132

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Detailed Demands for Grants 2026–2027 (Government of India 2026) https://www.meity.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/04/c764202f44d330b936e3a200f93738e9.pdf

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, ‘Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi Inaugurates SEMICON India 2026; Unveils India’s Ambitious Roadmap for Transition to Semicon 2.0, with Expanded Support for Design, Manufacturing, Packaging, R&D and Talent Development’ (Press Information Bureau, 17 September 2026) https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2311726

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Annual Report, Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), 2025 (National Statistics Office, March 2026) https://mospi.gov.in/uploads/publications_reports/publications_reports1780040415321_0624fb13-fb47-40bc-b470-7c7e9635c3ef_PLFS_2025_F_REV_29052026.pdf

Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, ‘Release of the Annual Survey of Industries (2024–25) Results’ (Press Information Bureau, 30 September 2026) https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleseDetailm.aspx?PRID=2316981&lang=1&reg=3

NITI Aayog, Investment Friendliness Index 2026 (July 2026) https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2026-07/Investment-Friendliness-Index.pdf

Sixteenth Finance Commission, Report for 2026–31, vol I (Government of India 2025) https://fincomindia.nic.in/asset/doc/commission-reports/16th-FC/reports/Vol1-Main-Report.pdf

Further reading

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