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Constitutional Morality Versus the Crowd: Ambedkar’s Warning and the Courts

Ambedkar meant constitutional morality as a civic discipline; the Supreme Court has made it a doctrine of review.

Constitutional Morality Versus the Crowd: Ambedkar’s Warning and the Courts

Introduction

On 4 November 1948, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly that constitutional morality “is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated.” Democracy in India, he said, was “only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic.” He was speaking about a habit of mind, not a legal test. Nearly eight decades later, the phrase is one of the most used and most contested ideas in Indian public law.

Since 2018, the Supreme Court has relied on it to answer claims that custom, faith, or popular feeling should decide what the law allows. On 8 April 2026, the second day of the Sabarimala reference hearing, the Union told a nine-judge bench that constitutional morality is vague and not a ground of judicial review at all. That bench reserved judgment on 14 May 2026, and the judgment had not been pronounced when the article was finalised.

For Ambedkar, constitutional morality was a discipline for citizens and for those who hold power. The courts have turned it into an instrument of review, with good outcomes, but this leaves the doctrine open to the charge that it is only the judges’ morality. The Ambedkarite version keeps the idea while anchoring it in constitutional text, so that a judgment says which Article is being applied and why.

The obvious objection is that this narrows protection. It does not. Part III is wide enough to carry every result the Court has reached in the name of constitutional morality, and a result tied to text is harder to attack and easier to enforce than one tied to a phrase. The article also asks whether the doctrine holds before a lynch mob, a mobilised religious majority, or a protest blocking a road. The Court has been firm on paper and weak on the ground, and that gap is the real test.

The article is doctrinal, not empirical. It draws on the two Constituent Assembly speeches, Supreme Court judgments from 2014 to 2024, the record of the 2026 hearing, and the commentary of Grote, Béteille and Mehta. It does not defend or condemn any movement, party or community.

The Speech of 25 November 1949

Ambedkar’s last speech to the Constituent Assembly was a warning. A Constitution could be good and still fail, because “however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot.”

He set out three things the country had to do. The first was to hold fast to constitutional methods. Where those methods were open, civil disobedience, non-cooperation, and satyagraha were “nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us.” The second, borrowing John Stuart Mill’s caution, was not to lay liberties at the feet of even a great man. “Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, Bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship.” The third was to turn political democracy into social democracy, since “political democracy cannot last unless there lies at the base of it social democracy.”

The three warnings describe the crowd in three shapes:

Crowds that press demands outside constitutional channels.

Crowds that gather behind a leader.

The anger of people kept out of social life, who may one day “blow up the structure of political democracy.”

Ambedkar treated these as problems for the people and the government, not for the courts. “If hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame except ourselves.”

What “Constitutional Morality” Means

The phrase entered Indian constitutional language on 4 November 1948, when Ambedkar explained why the draft included so much administrative detail. He borrowed from George Grote, the historian of Greece, who used it to describe the habit that let Athenian democracy survive. As Ambedkar rendered it, Grote meant by constitutional morality “a paramount reverence for the forms of the Constitution, enforcing obedience to authority acting under and within these forms yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen amidst the bitterness of party contest that the forms of the Constitution will not be less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own.” Indians had not yet learned this habit, so the forms of administration had to be written into the Constitution.

Two features of this origin matter. Constitutional morality was cultivated in citizens and rulers alike, not a rule a court applies, and it had a double content: obedience to constitutional forms together with open speech and sharp criticism of those in authority.

André Béteille read the idea as a set of constraints on majorities and their leaders, warning that in India popular mobilisation constantly pressed on constitutional procedure. Pratap Bhanu Mehta described it as self-restraint and a commitment to plurality, including a suspicion of hero-worship and readiness to let the other side win by the same rules. Neither treated the idea as a tool for striking down laws.

The phrase has evolved to mean two things: the morality of the Constitution, meaning its values of liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity, which is in the text, and Ambedkarite constitutional morality, which is a practice. The Court usually means the first, and using one phrase for both causes the present confusion.

How the Doctrine Was Built

The judicial life of the phrase began in the Delhi High Court. In Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, the Court read down Section 377 of the Penal Code and held that constitutional morality, not public morality, should guide the Article 14 test. The Supreme Court reversed that result in 2013, but the phrase survived, and between 2014 and 2018 the Court made it a working tool of review. Table 1 carries the main cases.

Manoj Narula v. Union of India (27 Aug 2014, Constitution Bench). Described as a principle binding those who hold public office: “to bow down to the norms of the Constitution.” The Court declined to read a disqualification into Article 75(1), but stated a “constitutional expectation” that the Prime Minister would not choose ministers charged with serious offences. Pinpoint: Paras 63-65 (constitutional morality); paras 53, 85-87 (holding).

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (4 Jul 2018, Constitution Bench). The Lieutenant Governor is bound by the aid and advice of Delhi’s elected government under Article 239AA(4). Used to describe office-holders’ duty to respect the federal and democratic structure. Pinpoint: Misra CJ, paras 57-61 (section D); conclusions in section V.

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (6 Sep 2018, Constitution Bench). Section 377 read down. Constitutional morality must prevail over social or majoritarian morality in deciding the rights of a minority. Pinpoint: Misra CJ, paras 111-124 and 253(v); Nariman J, paras 78-81; Malhotra J, para 21(i).

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 Sep 2018, Constitution Bench). Section 497 (adultery) struck down. A law treating a wife as the husband’s property could not survive constitutional morality. Pinpoint: Nariman J, para 23; Chandrachud J, paras 25, 34. (Misra CJ’s opinion does not use the phrase.)

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala) (28 Sep 2018, Constitution Bench, 4:1). Exclusion of women of menstruating age from the temple held unconstitutional. The majority read “morality” in Article 25(1) as constitutional morality. The dissent invoked the same idea to say the Court should leave matters of faith alone. Pinpoint: Misra CJ, paras 106-111 and 144(v); Malhotra J (dissenting), para 16(iii).

Table 1. Constitutional morality in the Supreme Court, 2014 to 2018.

Three things changed in these four years. The doctrine moved from a descriptive view taken in Manoj Narula to a reason for striking down laws in Navtej Singh Johar and Joseph Shine. It moved into private and religious life, and it acquired an enemy, since Navtej Singh Johar set constitutional morality against social and majoritarian morality while the Sabarimala majority set it against custom.

The Court’s principled answer to the crowd drew a sharp reply. On 8 December 2018, delivering the keynote address at the Second J.B. Dadachanji Memorial Debate in New Delhi, the then Attorney General, K.K. Venugopal, speaking in his personal capacity, described the Court’s use of constitutional morality as a dangerous tool whose destination no one could foresee, and said he hoped the concept would die an early death. This was a public speech, not an argument in court, but it set the terms for what the Union would later say to the nine-judge bench.

The doctrine now claims to bind public officials, to protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian laws and, through the lynching and demolition cases discussed next, to stand against mob action. Neither of the two judgments uses the phrase “constitutional morality” at all. Tehseen S. Poonawalla rests on the rule of law and on Article 21, and the demolition judgment on the rule of law, the separation of powers, Article 14 and the right to shelter under Article 21, with its directions issued under Article 142. That supports the position taken here.

Three Tests of the Doctrine

The mob

In Tehseen S. Poonawalla a three-judge bench led by Chief Justice Misra described lynching and vigilante violence as “horrendous acts of mobocracy”, held that no one “is entitled to take the law into his own hands” and that the States have the duty to see that no individual or group does so. It laid down preventive, remedial and punitive directions. Every State was to appoint a nodal officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police in each district, register FIRs at once, designate courts to try such cases, and frame a compensation scheme within a month. The Court also recommended that Parliament create a separate offence of lynching. The directions were addressed to the executive.

Six years later the Court faced the demolition of homes of persons accused of crimes. On 13 November 2024, in In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, Justices Gavai and Viswanathan held that the executive cannot punish a person by demolishing his house, because adjudication is the work of the courts. Its nationwide guidelines, issued under Article 142, require a show-cause notice returnable within the period under local law or fifteen days from service, whichever is later. The owner must be heard. The demolition must be video-recorded. Officials who break these rules face contempt and must restore the property at their own cost. The guidelines do not apply to unauthorised structures in public places such as roads, footpaths and water bodies, or where a court has ordered demolition.

The doctrine is full on paper but harder to see on the ground. On 16 July 2026 a bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Bagchi and Mohana declined to decide a batch of contempt petitions alleging that the 2024 guidelines had been violated. The order records that “multiple questions of fact arise for consideration,” transfers the record of the contempt and writ proceedings to the jurisdictional High Courts, which may take evidence through the district courts and are requested to decide preferably within four months, continues the interim protection, and expresses no opinion on the merits. During the hearing, as reported, the Chief Justice observed that where the authorities invoke the public-land exception is a dispute of fact that cannot be decided in contempt, and Justice Bagchi remarked that the judgment “cannot be read as a statute.” Neither observation appears in the written order. Whether or not that order was right, a doctrine that depends on the executive to obey it, and on the court to enforce it case by case, is only as strong as its weakest link.

The mobilised majority

After the Sabarimala judgment of 28 September 2018, large and organised protests followed in Kerala, and more than fifty review petitions were filed. On 14 November 2019 a five-judge bench, by a 3:2 majority, kept the review petitions pending and referred seven questions about religious freedom and other fundamental rights to a larger bench. Justices Nariman and Chandrachud dissented, holding that the review did not meet the ordinary test.

The nine-judge bench, headed by Chief Justice Surya Kant, began hearing the reference on 7 April 2026 and reserved judgment on 14 May 2026 after sixteen hearing days. On 8 April 2026, according to reports, the Solicitor General, Tushar Mehta, argued that constitutional morality is not a ground of judicial review but is vague and subjective, has displaced the “social morality” the text speaks of, that courts should not test legislation against elastic concepts, and that Ambedkar’s use of the phrase on 4 November 1948 concerned how constitutional functionaries should behave, not how courts should judge. The Supreme Court Observer reported Justice Bagchi as observing that constitutional morality may govern secular life while religious practices are shaped by the morality understood within the faith.

Because the matter is pending, nothing can be said about the result. The Union’s argument is the live form of the critique. It is partly textual, since Articles 25 and 26 speak of “morality” and not “constitutional morality,” partly historical, since Ambedkar meant something different, and partly institutional, since a vague standard puts much in the hands of judges. Whatever the bench decides, the doctrine is itself on trial.

The protest crowd

The third test is the hardest, because here the crowd is exercising a right. The Shaheen Bagh sit-in against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 occupied a Delhi road from December 2019 until March 2020. In Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police a three-judge bench held that “democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then the demonstrations expressing dissent have to be in designated places alone,” and that public ways and spaces “cannot be occupied in such a manner and that too indefinitely”. Occupation of public ways for protest, at that site or anywhere else, “is not acceptable,” and the administration must keep such areas clear, without hiding “behind the court orders”. The judgment lays down no requirement of notice or prior permission of its own. It refers to the earlier law on permission, Himat Lal K. Shah, and to the Jantar Mantar directions in Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan, and it does not use the phrase “constitutional morality.”

Read against Ambedkar’s double demand, the judgment shows the doctrine’s unfinished side. He asked for reverence for constitutional forms, and a public way kept open is such a form. However, he also asked for “open speech” and “unrestrained censure.” A protest that stays within the law is a constitutional method, not the grammar of anarchy. Amit Sahni resolved the clash on the text of Article 19, balancing the right to assemble against the rights of others to use the road, without invoking constitutional morality at all. That is consistent with the position taken here. But the Court has not said how the two halves of Ambedkar’s idea, reverence for forms and the freedom to censure, are to be weighed when a crowd is on the right side of the law.

Three outcomes

Against the mob, the enforcement remains weak. Against the mobilised majority, the doctrine has produced a backlash strong enough to put the doctrine itself before nine judges. Against the protest crowd, the Court has decided without the doctrine, on the text alone. The common lesson is the one Ambedkar drew. A judgment can state constitutional morality. It cannot by itself produce it.

The Critique, and a Version Faithful to Ambedkar

The critique has three parts.

Ambiguity: The Sabarimala majority used the phrase to admit women, and Justice Malhotra, in dissent, used it to say that constitutional morality in a secular polity requires the harmonisation of competing fundamental rights, so that the Court should not decide what is essential to a faith. Words that support both conclusions are a poor test.

Historical: Ambedkar’s speeches describe a civic discipline, not a ground of review, and the Union is right to say so.

Institutional: If constitutional morality is whatever a bench believes the Constitution stands for, a change of bench can change the law without a change in the text.

The defence, however, is not weak. Every outcome reached in the name of constitutional morality can be placed within a specific provision, as Table 2 sets out against the Articles that carry it.

Manoj Narula: No disqualification read into Art. 75(1); constitutional expectation stated. Articles: Arts. 75(1), 164(1). Pinpoint: Paras 53, 85-87

Government of NCT of Delhi: Lieutenant Governor bound by aid and advice. Articles: Art. 239AA(4) and proviso. Pinpoint: Misra CJ, conclusions, section V

Navtej Singh Johar: S. 377 IPC read down for consenting adults. Articles: Arts. 14, 19(1)(a), 21 (Misra CJ); Arts. 14, 15, 19, 21 (Malhotra J). Pinpoint: Misra CJ, para 253(xiii)-(xvii); Nariman J, para 82; Malhotra J, para 21(i)

Joseph Shine: S. 497 IPC and s. 198(2) CrPC struck down. Articles: Arts. 14, 15(1), 21. Pinpoint: Misra CJ, paras 23, 41, 56; Nariman J, para 28; Malhotra J, para 18(i)

Indian Young Lawyers Association: Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules ultra vires; exclusion unconstitutional. Articles: Art. 25(1) (majority); Art. 17 (Chandrachud J). Pinpoint: Misra CJ, para 144(iii), (v), (xii)

Tehseen S. Poonawalla: Directions against lynching. Articles: Art. 21; rule of law. Pinpoint: Paras 15, 34, 40

Demolition of Structures: Guidelines against punitive demolition. Articles: Arts. 14, 21; separation of powers; directions under Art. 142. Pinpoint: Paras 28, 53, 71, 78, 90-91

Amit Sahni: Indefinite occupation of a public way not protected. Articles: Art. 19(1)(a), (b) with cls. (2), (3). Pinpoint: Paras 14-20

Table 2. The textual basis of each result. Paragraph numbers follow the official copies of the judgments.

The phrase has been a way of saying why these Articles mean what they mean, not the only reason for the result. That is the basis for the position taken here. The Court should keep constitutional morality as an interpretive guide and stop using it as a free-standing ground of invalidity. Every judgment that invokes it should name the Article it is reading and show how the reading follows from the text. The objection is that this narrows protection. It does not, for three reasons. First, as Table 2 shows, there is no result in the existing law that the text cannot carry. Second, a judgment tied to text is harder for the executive to ignore and easier for a High Court to enforce, because the duty is specific. Third, a textual anchor answers the vagueness charge on its own terms. A doctrine tied to Articles is not elastic. Anchoring in text saves the doctrine rather than giving it up.

This version is also closer to Ambedkar. A judgment that explains its result through the text teaches the habit he wanted cultivated. A judgment that rests on a phrase invites the reader to ask whose morality is meant.

Findings and Recommendations

Ambedkar’s constitutional morality was a civic responsibility binding government, opposition, citizens and the bench alike. The Court has turned it into a doctrine of review. The doctrine has protected individual liberty and set limits on executive action against the mob. Its main weakness is enforcement. The 2018 lynching directions and the 2024 demolition guidelines depend on executive compliance that the Court has not been able to measure or secure, and in July 2026 the Court transferred the contempt proceedings under the demolition guidelines to the High Courts. Its present challenge is the nine-judge reference.

Three recommendations can be considered:

The Court should anchor every use of constitutional morality in constitutional text.

The State should treat compliance with the lynching and demolition guidelines as a measurable duty, with each State publishing the nodal officers appointed, the notices issued, the demolitions recorded and the compensation paid.

And civic education should make the speeches of 1948 and 1949 part of what every student learns about the Republic, because the habit Ambedkar described cannot be ordered by a court and can only be taught.

Conclusion

A Constitution cannot protect itself. Ambedkar said so in 1949 and the cases since 2014 confirm it. The Supreme Court has used constitutional morality to answer the crowd, and the answer has been principled. Yet the lynching directions did not stop lynching, the demolition guidelines did not stop demolitions, the Sabarimala judgment produced a reference that may redraw the doctrine, and the Shaheen Bagh judgment limited a protest without the doctrine at all. Constitutional morality holds where it is practised and fails where it is only pronounced. It must be practised by citizens, governments, the opposition and the courts together. If the nine-judge bench keeps the idea, it should tie it to the text. If it rejects the phrase, the text remains. Either way, the work Ambedkar assigned to the people remains to be done, and no bench can do it for them.

Frequently asked questions

What did Ambedkar mean by constitutional morality?
Borrowing from George Grote, he meant reverence for the forms of the Constitution combined with open speech and unrestrained censure of authorities. The article reads it as a civic discipline for citizens and rulers alike, not a rule a court applies.

How has the Supreme Court used constitutional morality?
Between 2014 and 2018 it moved from a descriptive principle in Manoj Narula to a reason for striking down laws in Navtej Singh Johar and Joseph Shine. The Sabarimala majority also used it against custom.

What is the Union's objection in the Sabarimala reference?
On 8 April 2026 the Solicitor General argued that constitutional morality is vague and subjective and not a ground of judicial review. The nine-judge bench reserved judgment on 14 May 2026, and the article was finalised before the verdict.

What does the author recommend?
The Court should use constitutional morality as an interpretive guide and name the Article each judgment reads, not treat it as a free-standing ground of invalidity. The author also proposes measurable State compliance with the lynching and demolition guidelines, and civic education on the 1948 and 1949 speeches.

Further reading from AFPR: The Grammar of Dissent: Why the Constitution Sends Protest to Institutions, Not the Street · Petition, Not Placard: Why the Street Cannot Stand In for the Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Constitution

List of Sources

Judgments

Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020) 10 SCC 439 (Supreme Court of India, 7 October 2020).

Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCC 501 (Supreme Court of India, 4 July 2018).

In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures 2024 INSC 866 (Supreme Court of India, 13 November 2024).

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 28 September 2018).

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39 (Supreme Court of India, 27 September 2018).

Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association (2020) 2 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 14 November 2019).

Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) 9 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 27 August 2014).

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 6 September 2018).

Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2009) 160 DLT 277 (Delhi High Court, 2 July 2009).

Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, 11 December 2013).

Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India (2018) 9 SCC 501 (Supreme Court of India, 17 July 2018).

Orders and Records of Proceedings of the Supreme Court

Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, R.P.(C) No. 3358 of 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373 of 2006, order dated 10 February 2020 (nine-judge bench).

Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association, R.P.(C) No. 3358 of 2018 in W.P.(C) No. 373 of 2006, Record of Proceedings, 7 April 2026 (Surya Kant CJ, Nagarathna, Sundresh, Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Masih, Varale, Mahadevan and Bagchi JJ).

In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, W.P.(C) No. 295 of 2022 and connected contempt petitions, Record of Proceedings, 16 July 2026 (Surya Kant CJ, Bagchi and Mohana JJ).

Constituent Assembly Debates

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 4 November 1948, speech of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, pp. 31-44 (Lok Sabha Secretariat).

Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. XI, 25 November 1949, concluding speech of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, pp. 972-981 (Lok Sabha Secretariat).

Books

Grote, G. (1846-1856). A History of Greece (12 vols.). London: John Murray. Vol. IV, Part II, ch. XXXI.

Journal Articles and Academic Commentary

Béteille, A. (2008). Constitutional morality. Economic and Political Weekly, 43(40), 35-42.

Mehta, P. B. (2010). What is constitutional morality? Seminar, (615).

Reports of Proceedings (where no underlying document exists)

ANI. (2018, December 9). AG Venugopal says SC exercises more power than any apex court.

Bar & Bench. (2018, December 8). Live record of the Second J.B. Dadachanji Memorial Debate.

LiveLaw. (2018, December 9). Constitutional morality a dangerous weapon, it will die with its birth: KK Venugopal.

LiveLaw. (2026a, April 8). Sabarimala reference | Never understood what transformative constitutionalism is: Solicitor General questions ‘constitutional morality’.

LiveLaw. (2026b, May 14). Sabarimala reference: Supreme Court 9-judge bench reserves verdict after 16 days hearing.

LiveLaw. (2026c, July 16). Supreme Court refuses to hear contempt pleas alleging violation of ‘bulldozer’ judgment, sends matters to High Courts.

LiveLaw. (2026d, August 11). Supreme Court indicates 9-judge Sabarimala reference decision likely in October.

Outlook India. (2026, October 1). Sabarimala case: Justice B.V. Nagarathna begins writing verdict in nine-judge bench reference.

Scroll.in. (2018, December 9). Hope constitutional morality dies with birth: Attorney General criticises Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Observer. (2026a, April 8). Sabarimala reference | Day 2: “Constitutional morality not a ground of judicial review,” argues Union.

Supreme Court Observer. (2026b, May 14). Sabarimala reference | Day 16: Supreme Court reserves judgement.

Verdictum. (2026a, April 8). Not a valid ground for judicial review: Centre attacks doctrine of constitutional morality, calls it ‘vague concept’ capable of elastic interpretation.

Verdictum. (2026b, July 16). Bulldozer justice: contempt petitions sent to High Courts for factual inquiry, to be decided within four months.

Further reading

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