An independent institute of public policy research · Lucknow, India

The Research Library · Justice and Legal Studies · Commentary

Counting Giants: Indonesia, India and the Management of Mass Electorates

Indonesia and India both build a voter list in stages. What a clearer route from error to correction would mean for India’s voters, and for the Election Commission.

Counting Giants: Indonesia, India and the Management of Mass Electorates

The list before the vote

The decisive moment in an election may occur long before a ballot is cast. A name enters a register, is misspelled, is corrected—or disappears. Each step looks administrative; together they determine who can exercise political voice. This article argues that India should strengthen routine correction and individual remedies while preserving the Election Commission’s authority to investigate ineligible entries. The Indonesia electoral roll provides a useful procedural comparison for India, not a model to transplant wholesale.

The comparison concerns the design of electoral registration, rather than an empirical ranking of either country’s performance. It separates three questions: the legal power to revise a roll, the evidence used in individual decisions, and the ability of an eligible voter to correct an error. The recommendations below are the author’s analysis of the primary materials identified at each factual claim.

The Indian mandate and its limits

Article 324 of India’s Constitution places electoral-roll preparation under the Election Commission of India (ECI). [1, art. 324(1)] The Representation of the People Act 1950 regulates voter qualifications, correction, inclusion and appeals. [2, ss. 16, 19–20, 22–24] Section 21(3) specifically authorises a special revision for recorded reasons. [2, s. 21(3)] Administrative flexibility therefore operates within a legal framework, rather than displacing it.

The ECI’s Bihar procedure used enumeration forms and field inquiries by Booth Level Officers (BLOs), followed by a draft roll published on 1 August 2025. [3, Bihar SIR 2025, fourth bullet] Its published instructions identified Form 6 for omitted eligible voters and Form 7 for objections to ineligible inclusions, initially advertising a deadline before 1 September 2025. [3, Bihar SIR 2025, sixth–seventh bullets] That was not an absolute end to correction: the final judgment records the ECI’s statement on 1 September that claims, objections and corrections could continue beyond that date, with consideration continuing until the last date for nominations. [4, para. 10.12] Returning an enumeration form, challenging a draft-roll omission and pursuing later correction must therefore be distinguished.

The final decision is Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. v Election Commission of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 640 of 2025 and connected petitions, 2026 INSC 564, delivered on 27 May 2026. [4, title page and date of judgment] The Supreme Court upheld the Bihar SIR as authorised and proportionate. [4, para. 186(a)–(b)] It treated existing enrolment as a rebuttable presumption. [4, para. 186(c)] It also distinguished limited electoral scrutiny of citizenship from a conclusive citizenship determination. [4, para. 186(f)] This validates the exercise considered by the Court; it does not establish that every individual entry was correct.

The earlier protective directions must be attributed separately. The interim order of 14 August 2025 required searchable publication of omitted names and reasons, local display and publicity, and notice that aggrieved persons could submit claims with Aadhaar. [5, para. 3(i)–(viii)] The order of 8 September 2025 directed acceptance of Aadhaar as a twelfth identity document, while rejecting its use as citizenship proof and preserving authenticity checks. [6, operative paragraph under ‘Rest of the matters’, p. 9] Neither direction originated in the May 2026 final judgment.

Indonesia electoral roll: data is the beginning, not the finished roll

Indonesia’s statutory sequence is more informative than a portal’s acronyms. Under Law No. 7 of 2017, the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) uses population data for voter-list preparation and comparison with the continuously updated previous final roll. [7, arts. 201(1)(b), 201(7)–(8), 202(1)] The village-level polling committee (Panitia Pemungutan Suara, PPS) publishes the provisional list (Daftar Pemilih Sementara, DPS) for fourteen days; public and election-participant responses must reach it within twenty-one days from publication, and correction follows within fourteen days after that response period. [7, art. 206(3)–(6)] The corrected DPS is displayed for seven days, followed by a further correction period of up to fourteen days and transmission towards the final list (Daftar Pemilih Tetap, DPT). [7, art. 207(1)–(3)]

The implementing rules make the route concrete. KPU Regulation No. 7 of 2022, read with its 2023 amendment, provides accessible local DPS display and possible online assistance. [8, art. 65(1)–(4)] The public, election supervisors and election participants may provide responses within twenty-one days; subjects include missing eligible voters, incorrect details, duplicate entries and ineligible registrations. [8, art. 66(1)–(2)] Responses go to the PPS using Model A-Tanggapan with the affected voter’s identity-card or family-card material, and PPS verifies the information. [8, art. 66(3)–(4)] Separately, amended article 19 requires direct household checking and correction of erroneous data. [9, art. I, item 1, art. 19(2)–(4)]

These provisions distinguish the public-display period from the period for receiving responses. Calling both a fourteen-day objection window would obscure the statutory design. They also distinguish a dataset supplied by government from the electoral list produced after checking and correction. The present comparison concerns the national general-election framework; Indonesia’s regional-election rules are a separate regime. The argument does not assume that a published procedural entitlement proves consistent implementation in every locality.

My reading is that this division of responsibilities creates a potential accountability gap when an identity-data discrepancy and an electoral-list error cross institutional boundaries. That is a structural inference, not an established finding that the KPU routinely redirects complainants or that population officials cause a quantified share of exclusions. A useful safeguard would be a single receipt for the complaint, an identified officer responsible for the answer, and a recorded referral when another agency must correct its own data. India should adapt that allocation of responsibility without allowing a population database to decide electoral eligibility automatically.

Accuracy and inclusion are joint duties

A register can fail in opposite directions. Duplicate or otherwise ineligible entries compromise the equal weight and credibility of the vote; wrongful exclusions deprive eligible persons of their opportunity to participate. A policy that celebrates only the number of names removed measures administrative activity, not constitutional success. Equally, a policy that ignores demonstrable duplication mistakes inclusion for accuracy. The more principled standard is two-dimensional: how reliably does the system detect ineligibility, and how quickly, fairly and accessibly does it restore eligible names? Neither figure should be hidden behind the other.

As a policy recommendation, a risk-based process may be more useful than treating every entry as equally suspicious. Contradictory records should trigger proportionate checking, with straightforward correction for ordinary errors. Automated matches should be investigative leads: a duplicated name, variant spelling or inconsistent address can reflect a clerical problem. The decision should record the relevant eligibility issue and the evidence considered, rather than allowing a software flag to supply the conclusion.

Equally important is the ability to understand the state’s decision. A citizen cannot correct an omission without learning the reason for it. The relevant measures are therefore not simply the number of discrepancies detected or entries removed. Administrators should publish anonymised aggregate statistics on notices, objections, reinstatements and appeals, and independent observers should be able to evaluate whether some communities are disproportionately burdened. Data privacy and auditability must be designed together.

A fair objection process is substantive, not ceremonial

Notice must reach people, not just exist on a website. India could combine online access with accessible local help desks, multilingual notices, disability-accessible formats and community-level assistance. Indonesia similarly needs an approach that reaches voters outside routine digital channels. The most elegant online appeal form cannot rescue a voter who never learns that an entry was altered.

The procedural comparison suggests that a correction window needs a published beginning, an intelligible route and a definite end. Indonesia’s separate display and response stages should prompt India to explain the relationship between enumeration, the draft roll and claims rather than presenting them as interchangeable deadlines. The precise Indian timetable must follow the applicable revision instructions and law. My proposal is to publish that timetable alongside each notice, including the route for a timely claim and the consequence of an adverse decision.

The remedy should be tied to the harm. An error in punctuation can be corrected administratively; a disputed eligibility decision calls for notice, evidence and appeal. Publicly available reasons, interpreted with due regard to sensitive data, can help advocates and officials distinguish isolated clerical errors from a systemic pattern. It is possible to respect institutional independence while requiring explanations for decisions that burden basic participation.

Where independent commissions meet civil registries

The institutional comparison suggests a distinction between running an election and possessing every current identity record. Cooperation should therefore include a record of data provenance and a clearly allocated correction responsibility. This is a design proposal, not a claim that either commission lacks a particular technical feature. A shared record should identify the source of a disputed change, the reviewing officer and the evidence needed to resolve it, with access limited according to privacy obligations.

Such traceability is not mere information-technology housekeeping. It can make legal remedies effective. If a voter challenges removal, the official responsible should be able to reconstruct the decision and explain its factual basis. Without that record, an appeal is confined to disputing an outcome the voter cannot see. In India, stronger change logs would complement the ECI’s constitutional role; in Indonesia, they could clarify responsibility across KPU and population administration.

Integration should avoid replacing legal qualifications with statistical proxies. Indian registration turns on statutory conditions rather than a database label. [2, ss. 16, 19–20] The policy implication is that a mismatch should identify an issue for review, not silently establish a new ground of exclusion. Both commissions could explain which data sources they use, the purpose of each match and how the voter may challenge an adverse result.

The strongest argument against this approach

The strongest institutional defence of intensive revision is straightforward: old electoral rolls accumulate mistakes, and a public authority cannot guarantee a credible election by refusing to re-examine them. That argument should not be caricatured. An erroneous entry can harm the integrity of the entire process. Yet the premise does not resolve the method. The relevant proportionality question is whether the same legitimate objective can be achieved through more targeted, comprehensible and contestable procedures, particularly for voters whose documentation is imperfect through no deliberate fault of their own.

That objection has force. The answer is not to prohibit rigorous revision. It is to apply proportionality to implementation: notice tailored to the severity of a proposed action, accessible correction, well-defined appeals, transparent aggregate outcomes and simplified treatment of trivial discrepancies. These choices protect administrative efficiency by reducing avoidable dispute while retaining authority to examine serious cases.

A second objection applies to Indonesia: continuous updating may create permanent instability if residents cannot tell which version of the list is authoritative. This too is legitimate. Continuous maintenance requires public snapshots, version control and legally fixed milestones. The final roll should be sufficiently stable to administer an election without abandoning a remedy for proven official mistakes.

What India can borrow, and what it should not

India should adopt a clearly staged, locally accessible correction route: BLOs should explain how enumeration differs from a Form 6 inclusion claim, help omitted voters prepare that claim during the published window, and provide a receipt that identifies the responsible Electoral Registration Officer (ERO). It should require specific evidence for Form 7 objections and a reasoned outcome with the available appeal route, preventing an objection from functioning as an automatic deletion request. It should avoid treating a missing enumeration form, an automated mismatch or Aadhaar alone as a substitute for a lawful eligibility decision; these recommendations protect India’s own eligible voters while preserving scrutiny of genuine ineligibility.

Those recommendations build on India’s existing procedures rather than proposing Indonesian forms for Indian voters. The ECI’s Bihar bulletin assigned Form 6 to inclusion claims and Form 7 to objections. [10, ‘BIHAR SIR 2025’, sixth–seventh bullets] It separately required an inquiry, a fair opportunity and a speaking order before deleting a name from the draft list. [10, procedural safeguards, second bullet after table D] The practical priority is to make each step usable: where the form goes, how evidence is supplied, which officer decides and how the voter learns the result.

For Indonesia, the reciprocal lesson is institutional clarity. A correction mechanism is stronger when officials distinguish a clerical mistake, an eligibility dispute and a problem requiring population-record amendment. This is a recommendation derived from the comparison, not an assertion that Indian litigation supplies binding rules for the KPU. Neither country needs to abandon its own legal architecture to improve the explanation and review of individual decisions.

An implementation agenda for election commissions

The first practical reform is to distinguish a register’s legal status from its statistical appearance. Election managers should publish a schedule describing when a database becomes a draft, when it becomes open to claims and objections, and when it becomes final for a particular election. These labels must have legal consequences. A notice of proposed deletion should not be confused with final disenfranchisement; a draft list should not be presented to citizens as an irreversible decision. An accessible public calendar is especially important when temporary review drives operate alongside continuous routine corrections.

Second, each proposed adverse change ought to have a traceable record. The record should identify the statutory ground, the date the issue arose, the relevant data source, the notice delivered, the response and the officer making the final determination. The public need not see personal files or protected data. But an affected voter should receive a comprehensible explanation and an authorised reviewer should be able to reconstruct the sequence. This creates a meaningful bridge between mass-scale administration and individual legal responsibility.

Third, governments should separate the measurement of administrative productivity from the measurement of electoral justice. The number of names removed after a revision may reflect legitimate corrections, but it tells us little about whether eligible people were excluded. Better indicators include the distribution of decisions by type, the share reversed after objection, the time taken to correct a verified mistake and the proportion of complaints resolved before election day. Because such figures can reveal sensitive patterns, they should be released in aggregated, privacy-preserving forms and interpreted cautiously.

Fourth, assistance should be regarded as a component of the process rather than as charity. A resident who cannot use a web portal, travels for work or lacks familiar documentation still needs a realistic path to participate. Election offices can plan mobile outreach, multilingual instructions and accessible verification appointments without compromising substantive eligibility standards. A system that provides the same digital interface to everyone may appear neutral while placing radically different burdens on people with unequal access to technology and records.

Finally, revision programmes should specify the role of independent observers, political parties and civil society without letting any participant appropriate the authority of the election commission. Assistance with locating missing names and supplying evidence can strengthen correction. It should not turn eligibility determinations into partisan contests. Published protocols, conflict-of-interest safeguards and consistent officer training can help officials distinguish legitimate public participation from improper interference.

A comparative test for policymakers

The comparison can be tested through five practical questions. What legal condition is in issue? Which record triggered the check? Was the affected person informed? Could the person supply a response through an accessible route? Can a reviewer reconstruct the decision? These questions are proposed evaluation criteria, not reported findings about either country’s administrative performance. They permit functional comparison without assuming that equivalent-looking forms confer identical powers or remedies.

Suppose a voter returns from seasonal work to find an address discrepancy. A purely database-led system may record the entry as anomalous. A rights-conscious system asks whether the discrepancy affects the legal qualification, whether simpler evidence can resolve it and whether notice was practicable. Suppose a death record has been assigned to the wrong person. A strong system allows rapid reinstatement without making the living citizen prove a negative through expensive litigation. These examples are illustrative, not claims about verified individual incidents in either country. They show how the same technical error can require a different legal remedy.

This approach also reduces the urge to frame integrity and access as the political property of different parties. Both are essential democratic interests. An opposition party should not dismiss plausible duplicate-registration concerns; an incumbent should not treat objections by excluded voters as proof of bad faith. Independent election institutions can lead by reporting the quality of decisions rather than merely defending their own authority. The legitimacy of an election does not rest on an impossible promise of perfect data. It rests on transparent rules and effective correction when mistakes are discovered.

Conclusion: count people, not just records

An electoral register is both an administrative instrument and a gatekeeper of participation. The comparative lesson is to make correction as operationally clear as verification. India can preserve intensive scrutiny where justified while helping voters distinguish enumeration from a claim, requiring specific grounds for objections and making adverse decisions reviewable. Indonesia’s staged public review provides a useful reference point, but the strongest reform is one that works within India’s institutions and gives eligible citizens a reliable route back onto the roll.

Frequently asked questions

What did the Supreme Court hold in the final Bihar SIR judgment?
In its judgment of 27 May 2026 the Court upheld the Bihar SIR as authorised and proportionate and treated existing enrolment as a rebuttable presumption. It also distinguished limited electoral scrutiny of citizenship from a conclusive citizenship determination.

How does the Indonesia electoral roll correction process work?
Under Law No. 7 of 2017 the village-level committee publishes the provisional list for fourteen days. Responses must reach it within twenty-one days, correction follows within fourteen days, and the corrected list is displayed for seven days before the final list.

What is the difference between Form 6 and Form 7 in the Bihar SIR?
Form 6 is for eligible voters who were omitted, and Form 7 is for objections to ineligible inclusions. The article recommends that Form 7 objections need specific evidence and a reasoned outcome.

What does the article recommend for India?
A clearly staged, locally accessible correction route in which Booth Level Officers explain the difference between enumeration and a Form 6 claim and give a receipt naming the responsible Electoral Registration Officer. A missing form, an automated mismatch or Aadhaar alone should not substitute for a lawful eligibility decision.

Further reading from AFPR: Counting the Counters: SIR Across the States, Phase by Phase · Verdict on the Voter List: What the Court Really Said

[1] Constitution of India, art. 324(1).

[2] Representation of the People Act 1950, ss. 16–24, especially ss. 19–21 and 24.

[3] Election Commission of India, Bihar SIR 2025, enumeration and Form 6/Form 7 instructions, bullets 3–7.

[4] Supreme Court of India, Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. v Election Commission of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 640 of 2025 and connected cases, 2026 INSC 564, judgment dated 27 May 2026, paras. 10.12 and 186(a)–(g).

[5] Supreme Court of India, Association For Democratic Reforms & Ors. v Election Commission of India, W.P.(C) No. 640/2025 and connected cases, interim order dated 14 August 2025, para. 3(i)–(viii), pp. 6–8. Also recorded in final judgment, para. 10.10.

[6] Supreme Court of India, same proceedings, interim order dated 8 September 2025, unnumbered operative paragraph under ‘Rest of the matters’, p. 9. Also recorded in final judgment, paras. 10.13 and 157.

[7] Indonesia, Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections, arts. 201–202 and 206–207. State Gazette 2017 No. 182.

[8] KPU Regulation No. 7 of 2022 on Preparation of Voter Lists in General Elections and the Voter Data Information System, arts. 65–66, read with KPU Regulation No. 7 of 2023.

[9] KPU Regulation No. 7 of 2023 amending KPU Regulation No. 7 of 2022, art. I item 1, substituted art. 19.

[10] Election Commission of India, ‘BIHAR SIR 2025 — DAILY BULLETIN: 1st Aug (3 PM) till 1st Sept (10 AM)’, 1 September 2025, procedural safeguards after table D and the ‘BIHAR SIR 2025’ bullets. Press Information Bureau, release ID 2162605.

Further reading

Pay by UPI

UPI QR code for Adhyayan Foundation, payable with any UPI appSave QR to your phone
  1. Scan with Google Pay, PhonePe, Paytm, BHIM or your bank's UPI app. On a phone, save the code and use Scan from gallery, or pay to the UPI ID below.
  2. Pay to Adhyayan Foundation and add in the note.
  3. Confirm here with the UPI reference (UTR) shown in your app after payment.

UPI ID

Payments are received by Razorpay on behalf of the Adhyayan Foundation for Policy and Research. Questions: afpr.office@gmail.com