An independent institute of public policy research · Lucknow, India

The Research Library · Justice and Legal Studies · Commentary

Two Statutes, One Planet: How Indonesia and India Write Climate Policy into Law

India’s carbon market runs on statute and rules, and Indonesia has just rewritten its own. What each can teach the other, and what India should carry to Antalya.

Two Statutes, One Planet: How Indonesia and India Write Climate Policy into Law

Climate law in India and Indonesia is not necessarily a single act

Climate governance rarely arrives in one comprehensive statute. Legislatures establish authority, governments issue rules, regulators measure compliance and courts review public power. Climate law in India and Indonesia has been built in these layers differently. The test of the comparison is whether institutions make responsibilities clear, produce verifiable results and allow affected parties to challenge decisions. India should preserve a workable domestic framework while learning from Indonesia’s regulatory changes. [1–4]

India: constitutional protection and an operating carbon market

In M.K. Ranjitsinh v Union of India, the Supreme Court considered protection of the Great Indian Bustard alongside the development of electricity-transmission infrastructure relevant to renewable energy. In paragraphs 24–27, the Court recognised a right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change, locating it in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The reasoning matters because climate impacts, including heat, drought and threats to health and livelihoods, can affect life and equality. Public authorities must therefore take climate-related harms seriously when exercising their powers. [1]

The judgment did not create a climate statute, prescribe a national emissions target or design India’s carbon market. It addressed climate harm in a dispute balancing biodiversity protection and renewable-energy infrastructure. The lesson is that climate regulation must be legally grounded and attentive to rights; detailed emissions obligations still require legislation and authorised rules. [1]

The Energy Conservation Act 2001, amended in 2022, authorises carbon-credit trading. The Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), notified in 2023, establishes the Indian Carbon Market. Under its compliance mechanism, designated industries receive greenhouse-gas emission-intensity targets; those that outperform may earn Carbon Credit Certificates (CCCs), while those that fall short must obtain and surrender certificates. [2–4]

The scale-up is measurable. Rules notified on 8 October 2025 covered 282 entities in aluminium, cement, chlor-alkali, and pulp and paper. An amendment on 13 January 2026 added 208 entities in secondary aluminium, petroleum refining, petrochemicals and textiles. On 12 February 2026, the Rajya Sabha was informed that 490 entities were covered in total. These are entities subject to targets, not emissions already eliminated. [4–6]

Under the scheme, entities monitor and report emissions within a defined gate-to-gate boundary, with verification by accredited agencies. Those that outperform their targets may earn tradable or bankable certificates; those that fall short must purchase or surrender certificates and may face environmental compensation. Targets measure emissions per unit of production, not an absolute cap on total emissions. Production growth can therefore affect whether lower intensity also means lower overall emissions. [6]

Indonesia: regulatory change and legal continuity

Indonesia’s statutory environmental foundation includes Law No. 32 of 2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, as amended. Its carbon-policy framework changed when Presidential Regulation No. 110 of 2025 revoked Presidential Regulation No. 98 of 2021. The transition is not a blanket cancellation of every earlier rule: Article 100 preserves implementing rules made under the earlier framework insofar as they do not conflict with the 2025 regulation and have not been replaced, while Article 101 provides for the revocation itself. [7–9]

This distinction matters to business. Companies cannot assume every earlier rule has disappeared or rely on the revoked regulation as though it remains in force. They must identify surviving subordinate rules and test them against the new framework. Clear transition guidance supports legal certainty and investment planning. [8, 9]

The new framework will still be judged by implementation. Measurement standards, allocation decisions, overlap between sectors and public access to compliance information will affect whether it produces credible reductions. Certificates can support accounting and compliance, but their value depends on reliable baselines, verification and transparent rules. [8, 9]

What India should keep, change and avoid

India should keep the statutory foundation of its carbon market, the CCTS compliance mechanism and sector-specific targets. It should strengthen the system through transparent baselines, accessible monitoring data, independent verification and clear calculations. Regulators should explain how targets are allocated, how overlapping sectoral coverage is handled and how affected entities can challenge errors. Publishing reliable information will help investors assess compliance risks and distinguish real improvements from accounting effects. [2–6]

India should avoid regulatory changes that leave businesses uncertain about governing instruments, commencement dates or existing obligations. Indonesia’s replacement of its 2021 regulation, while preserving qualifying subordinate rules, shows why transitions need precise repeal and savings provisions. Such predictability matters to investors making long-term capital decisions. India need not copy Indonesia’s institutional model.

Cement offers a concrete test: it was among the four sectors in the first group of 282 entities. Producers need credible baselines, consistent measurement and clear rules to plan efficiency investments. Unexplained target changes can delay investment; stable, verifiable rules can reward genuine improvements in emissions intensity. [4–6]

The comparison should also run in the other direction. Indonesia can examine India’s use of express legislative amendments to the Energy Conservation Act and the role of constitutional adjudication in recognising climate-related harms. These are not models to transplant wholesale: Indonesia has a different constitutional and administrative structure. But clearer statutory authority and meaningful judicial scrutiny can help ensure that executive carbon-market rules remain legally accountable. [1, 2]

The strongest argument against a more consolidated framework

A serious objection to a highly detailed climate statute is that technology, energy markets and measurement methods change faster than primary legislation. Rigid provisions can lock in outdated methods, delay projects or impose costs before alternatives are affordable, a real concern for a developing economy balancing growth, energy access and emissions reduction.

That does not justify fragmented or unpredictable regulation. Parliament can set durable principles, powers, transparency duties and review mechanisms, while regulators update technical standards through published procedures. Changes should be lawful, explained and reviewable. [1–5]

COP31: connect domestic rules with India’s negotiating priorities

India’s COP31 priorities, announced by the Union Environment Minister on 3 November 2026, give this comparison an immediate international dimension. India will seek a decision to commence the Climate Finance Work Programme and argues that developed-country finance under Paris Agreement Article 9.1 should be predictable, largely public and concessional, without adding to debt burdens. It also wants mitigation and the Global Stocktake to remain Party-driven, facilitative and non-punitive, respecting nationally determined contributions rather than introducing new top-down targets. [10]

India should press for scaled-up adaptation finance, voluntary Global Goal on Adaptation indicators that do not condition access to finance, and continuation of the Party-driven Just Transition Work Programme. It should also address cost, intellectual-property and trade barriers to technology transfer. [10]

At home, decarbonisation can impose costs on workers, smaller suppliers and regions dependent on emissions-intensive production. India should connect climate finance and technology access with support for affected communities. The question is not only whether targets are met, but who pays and who benefits. [1, 10]

These requests follow from the domestic comparison. India’s industrial targets need reliable measurement, but the transition also requires affordable technology, investment certainty and support for affected communities. COP31 should improve access to finance and technology while respecting national pathways. India needs a coherent framework: clear duties, verifiable results and fairly shared transition costs.

Frequently asked questions

Does India have a single climate law?
No. The Energy Conservation Act 2001, amended in 2022, authorises carbon-credit trading, and the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme was notified in 2023. In M.K. Ranjitsinh the Supreme Court recognised a right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change under Articles 14 and 21, but did not create a climate statute.

How many entities does India’s carbon market cover?
Rules notified on 8 October 2025 covered 282 entities, and an amendment of 13 January 2026 added 208 more. The Rajya Sabha was told on 12 February 2026 that 490 entities were covered. These are entities subject to targets, not emissions already eliminated.

What changed in Indonesia’s carbon regulation?
Presidential Regulation No. 110 of 2025 revoked Presidential Regulation No. 98 of 2021. Article 100 preserves implementing rules made under the earlier framework insofar as they do not conflict with the new regulation and have not been replaced.

What does India want at COP31 in Antalya?
India will seek a decision to start the Climate Finance Work Programme and argues that developed-country finance under Paris Agreement Article 9.1 should be predictable, largely public and concessional. It also wants the Global Stocktake to remain Party-driven and non-punitive.

Further reading from AFPR: Climate Finance and Green Investment in India: Bridging the Gap Between Ambition and Action · Common but Differentiated: What the Principle Means in Law, and What India Should Do With It

[1] Supreme Court of India, M.K. Ranjitsinh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2024 INSC 280, judgment dated 21 March 2024, paras. 24–27.

[2] Government of India, The Energy Conservation Act, 2001, as amended by the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022.

[3] Ministry of Power, Government of India, Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, 2023, Gazette notification dated 28 June 2023.

[4] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, Greenhouse Gases Emission Intensity Target Rules, 2025, G.S.R. 739(E), 8 October 2025.

[5] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, Greenhouse Gases Emission Intensity Target (Amendment) Rules, 2025, G.S.R. 25(E), 13 January 2026.

[6] Government of India, Rajya Sabha, Starred Question No. 142, “Greenhouse Gas Emission Intensity (GEI) Targets,” answered 12 February 2026.

[7] Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 32 of 2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, as amended.

[8] Republic of Indonesia, Presidential Regulation No. 110 of 2025 on the Implementation of Carbon Economic Value Instruments and National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Control, Arts. 100–101.

[9] JDIH BPK, Presidential Regulation No. 110 of 2025, legislative record.

[10] Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, “India to pursue Solution-oriented and Equitable Climate Action at UNFCCC COP31 in Antalya,” Press Information Bureau, 3 November 2026.

Further reading

Pay by UPI

UPI QR code for Adhyayan Foundation, payable with any UPI appSave QR to your phone
  1. Scan with Google Pay, PhonePe, Paytm, BHIM or your bank's UPI app. On a phone, save the code and use Scan from gallery, or pay to the UPI ID below.
  2. Pay to Adhyayan Foundation and add in the note.
  3. Confirm here with the UPI reference (UTR) shown in your app after payment.

UPI ID

Payments are received by Razorpay on behalf of the Adhyayan Foundation for Policy and Research. Questions: afpr.office@gmail.com