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The Algorithm and the Agitation: Media, Platforms and the Making of Movements

Platforms decide what is seen, but they do not make movements alone. A reading of the 2026 Cockroach Janta Party episode and earlier Indian movements shows that accountability lies first with the authority that restricts speech…

The Algorithm and the Agitation: Media, Platforms and the Making of Movements

From grievance to public mobilisation

Dissent in India has always evolved alongside its tools of communication, from pamphlets and corner meetings to trade unions and street rallies. Digital platforms have accelerated this process, introducing unprecedented speed, scale and low-barrier participation into public debate. An unverified video can circulate before editorial examination, a hashtag can connect strangers around a shared concern, and a meme can turn a complex grievance into a recognisable symbol. Yet visibility does not automatically produce political consensus, durable institutional change or democratic legitimacy.

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), an online satirical initiative that emerged in 2026, illustrates how digital platforms and protest movements now interact. Reuters reported that the group surfaced amid public debate surrounding remarks by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant about unemployed youth and fraudulent degrees. Through satire, it drew attention to anxieties around unemployment, inflation and institutional accountability (Sharma & Das, 2026). The controversy was not simply a misunderstanding of a judicial remark, nor does it establish that the judiciary had dismissed the concerns of unemployed young people.

The central question is therefore: how do media outlets and digital platforms turn a personal grievance into a public movement, and who is accountable for the consequences? Platforms influence what becomes visible, but they do not operate in isolation. Newsrooms, offline organisations, state authorities and civic institutions all shape whether online mobilisation leads to public debate, policy change, street protest or administrative intervention.

The algorithmic public square: Who gets heard?

Digital platforms are not neutral public noticeboards. Recommendation systems, trending rankings and repost mechanisms influence what users encounter and how long an issue remains visible. Content that provokes strong emotional reactions like anger, amusement, anxiety or group identification can spread rapidly. This does not mean that all platforms use identical systems or that provocative content always dominates. It does mean that commercial distribution models shape public attention in ways users cannot easily see or challenge.

Research by Huszár et al. (2022), examining political communication on Twitter across seven countries, found greater aggregate algorithmic amplification for mainstream right-wing parties than for mainstream left-wing parties in six of them. The study offers evidence that ranking systems can produce politically uneven visibility. It does not establish that the same pattern necessarily applies to India’s diverse digital landscape, nor does it show that algorithms independently cause protests. Its significance lies in demonstrating why the distribution of political information by privately owned platforms deserves scrutiny.

Hashtags and memes lower the barriers to participation. A hashtag gives an issue a searchable identity; a meme compresses a complicated debate into a shareable image; and a repost allows someone to express solidarity without joining a formal organisation. These tools can bring neglected grievances into public view. But ease of participation also makes it possible for speculation to circulate as fact and for individuals to become targets of harassment. Engagement figures alone cannot establish whether a claim is accurate, whether its supporters represent wider public opinion or whether online attention will translate into lasting organisation.

Visibility is not the same as political influence. A grievance may trend nationally and disappear within days, while campaigns led by unions, professional associations and community organisations can secure change without dominating social media. Broadcast journalists can give a viral claim wider legitimacy, but that visibility must be accompanied by independent reporting and verification. Similarly, an official response to an online campaign does not necessarily amount to a policy concession. The relevant question is how platform distribution interacts with existing political networks, news coverage and institutional responses, not whether technology alone explains a complex social event.

From grievance to collective identity: The CJP episode

The CJP illustrates how satire can turn diffuse frustration into a recognisable collective identity. Emerging in May 2026 after controversy over remarks by the Chief Justice of India, the group adopted the cockroach as a symbol of resilience and presented itself as the “Voice of the Lazy and Unemployed”. Within days, it attracted millions of Instagram followers. Its posts addressed unemployment, inflation, media independence and examination-related concerns, while its founder described the campaign as an attempt to bring young people’s issues into mainstream political debate. The combination of humour, a shared symbol and accessible online participation helped turn individual grievances into a collective public identity.

The campaign also illustrates how digital mobilisation can shape the interpretation of public controversies. The original judicial remarks, subsequent clarification, memes and user commentary circulated together, sometimes detached from their initial context. The resulting debate was therefore not simply a reproduction of the original statement; it became a wider conversation about unemployment, institutional accountability and whether young people felt represented in public life (Sharma & Das, 2026).

The CJP episode soon raised questions about the limits of online expression. Its X account was withheld in India following a Central Government blocking order. Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 permits the Central Government or an authorised officer to direct the blocking of public access to information on specified statutory grounds and subject to prescribed safeguards. On 7 July 2026, the Delhi High Court directed that the blocking order be revoked after the Centre submitted that its primary concern – that the account could mislead students and parents about the cancellation of NEET 2026 – no longer survived once the examination was over. The Court allowed the petition on that basis; it did not deliver a general ruling on the constitutionality of the original blocking action (Abhijeet Dipke v. Union of India, 2026).

The campaign subsequently moved beyond online mobilisation into street protests. In October 2026, CJP-led demonstrations included demands for the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over alleged irregularities in electoral-roll revisions (Reuters, 2026). The resulting public-order dispute brought restrictions on essential services under judicial scrutiny. In its order of 9 October in M.A. Baby v. Union of India (2026), the Supreme Court recorded that certain trains had been directed to cease operations or be cancelled, while entry to 57 metro stations was to be closed from 9 p.m. The Court observed that the measures appeared to impose a complete ban on essential public transportation. Following the Solicitor General’s assurance that the restrictions would be reassessed in accordance with proportionality, the Court clarified that there should be no outright prohibition on metro services and asked that any regulated arrangement be given wide publicity.

The matter returned to the Court on 11 October in Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Govind Mohan (2026), following allegations that the earlier directions had not been complied with. The Court recorded the government’s denial of those allegations, found a prima facie case for issuing notice in the contempt proceedings and issued interim directions concerning the normal functioning of metro and railway services, unhindered internet facilities and the free movement of people, subject to lawful restrictions. These were interim directions, not a final finding of contempt.

The two episodes involved different forms of state intervention: one concerned the blocking of a social media account, while the other concerned restrictions affecting public transport, internet access and public assembly. They should not be treated as interchangeable, nor do the judicial proceedings amount to a sweeping verdict against all restrictions imposed in the name of public order.

The state has a legitimate responsibility to prevent violence, protect commuters and residents, safeguard public property and maintain essential services. However, the existence of a public-order concern cannot, by itself, settle whether a particular restriction is justified. Its legal basis, necessity, duration and proportionality must be assessed in relation to the specific circumstances. The CJP episode thus illustrates a central challenge of digital mobilisation: responding to genuine security concerns without allowing the regulation of public order to unnecessarily narrow the constitutional space for peaceful expression and assembly.

Digital platforms and protest movements: the politics of visibility

The 2018 resurgence of #MeToo India illustrates how digital platforms can turn individual experiences into a collective public conversation. Following accounts of sexual harassment shared by women online, social media provided a space to speak publicly, find solidarity and challenge the silence surrounding misconduct. However, the movement’s reach did not translate into equal representation or safety for everyone. Pain’s (2021) study, based on tweets and interviews with participants and activists, found that the work of prominent activists was critical to the campaign, while suburban women’s voices and experiences remained underrepresented. Similarly, Al Dahdah et al. (2024), analysing 354,496 tweets from 2018 to 2021 alongside media coverage and interviews, examined how online abuse could contribute to women’s self-censorship and withdrawal from the platform. The episode therefore shows both sides of digital mobilisation: platforms can make previously marginalised grievances visible, but the same spaces can reproduce exclusion and hostility.

The farmers’ movement against the three central farm laws of 2020 combined digital communication with established agrarian unions, community networks, mainstream news coverage and sustained physical protest. Farmers mobilised at Delhi’s borders and maintained encampments for over a year. Digital networks helped circulate logistics, document confrontations and challenge media narratives, while existing organisations and local support sustained the agitation. Gupta et al. (2022), drawing on twenty semi-structured interviews, describe how virtual spaces supported hybrid organisation and coalition-building. The Union government’s announcement that the three laws would be repealed in November 2021 marked a major policy shift (Prime Minister’s Office, 2021). Attributing that outcome solely to hashtags or viral posts would overlook the movement’s physical presence, organisational capacity and bargaining power.

The protests following the alleged rape and murder of a postgraduate trainee doctor at Kolkata’s R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital in August 2024 offer another example of online mobilisation translating into physical assembly. Social media calls for a “Reclaim the Night” protest encouraged citizens to gather in public spaces, while resident doctors, medical students and civic groups organised demonstrations and walkouts. The Supreme Court’s 20 August order records widespread protests and the vandalism of parts of the hospital by a mob during the night of 14–15 August (In Re: Alleged Rape and Murder Incident, 2024).

The vandalism must be distinguished from the peaceful demonstrations of thousands of citizens. Digital calls helped people coordinate and express solidarity, but professional associations, public outrage, media coverage and institutional investigations also shaped the response.

These movements demonstrate that online visibility can help a grievance travel, connect participants and attract institutional attention. They also show that the character and outcome of mobilisation depend on factors beyond the platforms themselves: organisational networks, credible information, offline participation and the conduct of both public authorities and participants.

Dissent, disinformation and the state response

Digital communication carries genuine risks alongside its democratic possibilities. The same feed can circulate investigative reporting, first-hand testimony, rumours and deliberate propaganda. During a protest, an old video may be presented as current footage, speculation may be repeated as fact, and corrections may fail to reach the audience that saw the original claim. Coordinated harassment can expose personal information, intimidate participants and push dissenting voices offline. Disinformation may inflame tensions, expose individuals to threats and make an already volatile situation more difficult to manage. These harms deserve serious attention; they should not be treated as incidental to the debate about online expression.

Three questions must be kept separate: is the content inaccurate or unverified; does it violate a specific law; and is a restriction on it lawful, necessary and proportionate? A false statement does not automatically meet the legal threshold for government blocking under Section 69A. Criticism of public officials is not unlawful merely because it is embarrassing or politically inconvenient. Conversely, a genuine grievance does not give organisers or participants immunity if their own conduct crosses legal boundaries, such as direct incitement to violence.

The state’s responsibility to maintain public order is not a pretext that can be dismissed in advance. Large gatherings can affect transport networks, public infrastructure and essential services, particularly in sensitive or high-security areas. Where authorities have credible information about an imminent threat, preventive measures may be justified. The challenge is to match the response to the risk. A traffic diversion, a regulated protest site or targeted action against demonstrably unlawful content may address a specific concern without unnecessarily restricting wider communication or peaceful assembly. Measures that disrupt essential communication or public movement require a clear explanation of their necessity, scope and duration.

The October 2026 CJP events illustrate why both public-order concerns and constitutional scrutiny matter. The restrictions on transport and internet access became subjects of judicial scrutiny, with the Supreme Court examining their impact on essential services, communication and peaceful assembly. The proceedings demonstrate why preventive measures must be assessed against specific risks and remain open to judicial review.

A democratic response to disinformation must also distinguish deliberate manipulation from error, satire, criticism and legitimate disagreement. Treating every disputed claim as a public-order threat risks suppressing the very debate through which falsehoods can be challenged. Equally, invoking free expression cannot excuse threats, doxxing, targeted harassment or incitement to violence. The task is to protect public safety without treating lawful dissent as a security problem in itself.

The constitutional framework begins with Article 19. Article 19(1)(a) protects freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) protects the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. These rights are subject to the specific grounds in Articles 19(2) and 19(3), including public order and sovereignty. The existence of these grounds recognises the state’s responsibility to protect the public; it does not give the executive unrestricted discretion. Restrictions must have a legal basis and remain within constitutional limits.

In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act because its vague language criminalising “offensive” online messages could chill legitimate speech. The Court upheld Section 69A and the 2009 Blocking Rules, recognising the statutory grounds and procedural safeguards they contained. It also read down Section 79, clarifying the circumstances in which intermediaries could be required to remove content. In particular, the Court clarified that an intermediary’s obligation to remove content on the basis of actual knowledge arises through a court order or notification by the appropriate government or its authorised agency, rather than merely upon receiving private complaints. The judgment remains central to the principle that the state cannot bypass legal procedure simply because communication takes place online.

In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court held that freedom of speech and expression and the right to carry on trade and business over the internet receive constitutional protection. It ruled that indefinite internet suspensions are impermissible, that suspension orders must be published and that restrictions are subject to proportionality and judicial review. The Court did not prohibit every temporary suspension in an emergency. It required such measures to remain within constitutional and legal limits.

The Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, issued under the Telecommunications Act, 2023, provide a separate framework for telecom suspensions. Rule 3 requires a written order by the competent authority, recorded reasons, publication, a clearly defined geographical area and a specified duration not exceeding fifteen days. A copy must be forwarded to the review committee within 24 hours, and the committee must meet within five days to examine the order. A temporary network suspension is therefore legally distinct from blocking a particular account or item of content under Section 69A.

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, as amended, impose due-diligence obligations on intermediaries and establish requirements for specified categories of digital publishers. The 2026 amendment introduced provisions concerning synthetically generated information and modified certain intermediary obligations. These Rules should not be conflated with Section 69A: the latter provides the statutory basis for specified blocking directions, while the Rules govern intermediary and digital-media obligations within their scope.

The distinction matters in practice. A platform removing a post under its community guidelines, a ministry issuing a Section 69A blocking direction and a government suspending mobile internet operate under different powers and standards. Calling all three “censorship” may obscure who made the decision and what legal safeguards apply. Meaningful accountability requires affected people to know what was restricted, under which authority, for how long and through what process it can be challenged.

Who is accountable?

The primary legal duty rests with the authority that imposes a restriction. For content blocking under Section 69A of the IT Act, this is the Central Government or its authorised officer, who must act on specified statutory grounds and follow the prescribed safeguards. For telecom suspension, the competent government authority under Section 20 of the Telecommunications Act, 2023, and the 2024 Suspension Rules bears responsibility for establishing necessity, recording reasons and complying with review requirements. For restrictions on public assembly, the police and executive authorities responsible for regulating the protest must ensure that measures are lawful, necessary and proportionate.

When a platform independently removes or limits content under its own policies, the platform is accountable for applying those policies transparently and providing an effective appeal.

Other actors have distinct but secondary responsibilities. Platforms must disclose relevant moderation decisions and address coordinated abuse; newsrooms must verify claims and distinguish allegations from established facts; and protest organisers must communicate responsibly, correct misinformation and remain accountable for their own conduct. Participants are answerable for their individual actions, not automatically for the conduct of an entire gathering. Courts provide independent scrutiny of state action, while review committees perform the oversight assigned to them by law.

Ultimately, the authority exercising the power bears the primary legal duty to justify its restriction. The others owe transparency, accuracy, responsible conduct and cooperation with lawful processes, but their responsibilities must not be used to dilute or transfer the state’s constitutional obligations.

The priority: Transparent, reasoned and reviewable decisions

The most important policy priority is a binding standard of transparent, reasoned and reviewable decision-making whenever political speech or communication networks are materially restricted.

Transparency requires people to know what has been restricted and under which authority. Written reasons allow decisions to be assessed against the relevant statutory grounds, whether under Section 69A or the 2024 Telecom Suspension Rules. Timely and meaningful independent review gives affected people a way to challenge error, overreach or disproportionate action. These safeguards should operate in practice, not merely exist on paper.

This recommendation does not call for sweeping new internet regulations or a larger system of executive control. Broad administrative powers can create further opportunities to restrict public debate. The immediate priority should instead be strict compliance with existing safeguards, accessible remedies and effective review. The same procedural principle can apply across different forms of restriction without pretending that account blocking, platform moderation and network shutdowns are legally identical.

Greater oversight must also avoid creating a chilling effect. If platforms face vague or excessive legal liabilities, they may remove lawful political criticism, protest art and investigative reporting simply to avoid penalties or conflict with authorities. Broad state powers to determine what counts as “misinformation” can also be misused against anti-corruption reporting or legitimate opposition. Accountability must therefore be anchored in clearly defined legal grounds and independent scrutiny, not vague standards such as “harmful” or “anti-national.”

The answer to opaque censorship is not more opaque censorship. Private platforms may enforce clear terms of service and comply with lawful orders, but they cannot replace courts, independent journalism or public debate. Nor can the state treat peaceful criticism as a threat merely because it is politically inconvenient. India’s policy choice is not between absolute platform immunity and unrestricted state control. It is between decisions that remain secret and difficult to challenge, and decisions that are reasoned, proportionate and open to scrutiny.

Conclusion: The right to dissent and the power to be heard

Digital platforms have changed how grievances circulate, how people recognise shared concerns and how protest calls reach wider audiences. The CJP episode, the farmers’ movement, #MeToo India and the RG Kar protests illustrate different relationships between online visibility, offline organisation, media attention and institutional response. They do not establish that algorithms independently create movements or determine their outcomes.

Visibility affects which claims enter public debate, but it is not proof of truth, representativeness or democratic legitimacy. Accountability must therefore focus on the institutions that distribute information, report it, restrict it and respond to it.

The most defensible policy priority is to ensure that material restrictions on public and political communication are lawful, reasoned, proportionate and meaningfully reviewable. This approach recognises the state’s responsibility to maintain public order without treating every restriction as justified or every protest as unlawful. A democratic public sphere requires both the right to speak and a fair opportunity to be heard. Protecting it means scrutinising the power to amplify, the power to report and the power to restrict without allowing any one of them to escape accountability.

Frequently asked questions

What is the Cockroach Janta Party?
It is an online satirical initiative that emerged in May 2026 after controversy over remarks by the Chief Justice of India. It presented itself as the “Voice of the Lazy and Unemployed” and attracted millions of Instagram followers within days.

Why did the Delhi High Court direct the unblocking of the CJP’s X account?
On 7 July 2026 the court directed revocation of the blocking order after the Centre submitted that its main concern, that the account could mislead students and parents about the cancellation of NEET 2026, no longer survived once the examination was over. The court did not rule on the constitutionality of the original order.

Who is accountable when speech or communication is restricted?
The authority that imposes the restriction bears the primary legal duty. That is the Central Government for Section 69A blocking, the competent authority for telecom suspensions and the police and executive for restrictions on assembly. Platforms are accountable for applying their own policies transparently.

What policy priority does the article propose?
A binding standard of transparent, reasoned and reviewable decisions whenever political speech or communication networks are materially restricted. It calls for strict compliance with existing safeguards rather than sweeping new internet regulation.

Further reading from AFPR: The Grammar of Dissent: Why the Constitution Sends Protest to Institutions, Not the Street · Petition, Not Placard: Why the Street Cannot Stand In for the Supreme Court, the Election Commission and the Constitution

References

Abhijeet Dipke v. Union of India, W.P. (C) 7768/2026 & CM APPL. 37535/2026 (Delhi High Court, July 7, 2026).

Al Dahdah, M., Arfaoui, M., & Chartier, M. (2024). #MeTooIndia: Automating hate on social networks in India. Journal of Digital Media & Policy, 15(3), 325–340.

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (Supreme Court of India, January 10, 2020).

Constitution of India, 1950.

Government of India. (2000). The Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act No. 21 of 2000).

Government of India. (2009). Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009.

Government of India. (2023). The Telecommunications Act, 2023 (Act No. 44 of 2023).

Gupta, P., Petterson, A., Motla, D., & Chandra, P. (2022). Ladange, Adange, Jeetange: The farmers’ movement and its virtual spaces. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 6(CSCW2), Article 446.

Huszár, F., Ktena, S. I., O’Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., & Hardt, M. (2022). Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 119(1), e2025334119.

In Re: Alleged Rape and Murder Incident of a Trainee Doctor in R.G. Kar Medical College and Hospital, Kolkata and Related Issues, SMW (Crl.) No. 2 of 2024, 2024 INSC 613 (Supreme Court of India, August 20, 2024).

M.A. Baby v. Union of India, W.P. (C) Diary No. 63560/2026, with W.P. (Crl.) Diary No. 63544/2026 (Supreme Court of India, October 9, 2026).

Ministry of Communications, Department of Telecommunications. (2024, November 22). The Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024 (G.S.R. 724(E)).

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2021). Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, as amended.

Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2026, February 10). Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Amendment Rules, 2026 (G.S.R. 120(E)).

Pain, P. (2021). “It took me quite a long time to develop a voice”: Examining feminist digital activism in the Indian #MeToo movement. New Media & Society, 23(11), 3139–3155.

Prime Minister’s Office. (2021, November 19). PM addresses the nation. Prime Minister of India.

Reuters. (2026, October 2). Hundreds from India’s Gen Z-led ‘cockroach’ party protest, seek election chief’s resignation. Reuters.

Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Govind Mohan, Contempt Petition (Civil) Diary No. 63801/2026, with W.P. (Crl.) Diary No. 63858/2026 (Supreme Court of India, October 11, 2026).

Sharma, S., & Das, K. N. (2026, May 21). India’s ‘Cockroach’ group goes viral, spotlights Gen Z worries. Reuters.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India, March 24, 2015).

Further reading

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