ARTICLE 121 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

By – Rashmi Narasimhan

The independence of judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law which is a basic feature of the constitution and the judiciary must be free from executive pressures and all the other forms of pressures.[1]

INTRODUCTION TO ARTICLE 121

The Article 121 deals with the restriction on discussion in parliament.[2] It stipulates that:

“No discussions shall take place in Parliament with respect to the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties expect upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge as hereinafter provided.” [3]

Article 121 of the Indian Constitution addresses the issue of restrictions on discussions in Parliament. This article plays a crucial role in maintaining the decorum and integrity of parliamentary proceedings. It ensures that discussions within the Parliament remain focused on the matters at hand and avoid any unnecessary controversies or personal attacks.[4] This provision is crucial for maintaining the independence of judiciary by ensuring that the conduct of judges are not held in a manner that undermines their authority or interferes with their ability to deliver justice.[5] It recognizes the importance of an independent judiciary and protects judges from unwarranted criticism or interference in their functioning. It prevents the misuse of parliamentary privileges to tarnish the reputation of judges without proper investigation or evidence. The provision provides a clear process for addressing judicial misconduct (through impeachment) thereby ensuring accountability while preventing arbitrary accusations. MPs can initiate impeachment proceedings, but they cannot leverage their speech privileges to make unsubstantiated allegations in public forums like the parliament. This provision balances judicial accountability with judicial independence and prevents political influence.

In C. Ravichandran Iyer vs Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee[6] the Supreme Court held that the role of the judge is not merely to interpret the law but also to lay new norms of law but also to lay new norms of law and to mould the law to suit the changing social and economic scenario to make the ideals enshrined in the constitution meaningful and a reality. The judge must act independently, if he is to perform the functions as expected of him and he must feel secure that such action of his will not lead to his own downfall. Every endeavour should be made to preserve independent judiciary as a citadel of public justice and public security to fulfil the constitutional role assigned to the judges.[7] The prior proof of misconduct in accordance to law should be done in order to lift the bar under this Article.[8]

In Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability and etc vs Union of India and Ors., etc[9] the Supreme Court unanimously agreed and held that the object of Article 121 is to prevent a public discussion of the conduct of a judge is in public interest and its importance cannot be diluted. It said the following:

“The object of Article 121 is to prevent any discussion in Parliament with respect to the conduct of a Judge of the Superior Courts, except when it cannot be avoided. The Article, accordingly, prohibits such a discussion except upon a motion for presenting an ‘address’ to the President for removal of a Judge. The point is that if the entire proceeding in regard to the removal of a Judge from the very initial stage is assumed to be in the House, does the bar under Article 121 get lifted at that very stage, thus frustrating the very purpose of the Arti- cle”[10]

Therefore, Article 121 serves as a vital safeguard for judicial independence by restricting discussions in parliament about the conduct of judges except in the context of impeachment proceedings. This ensures that judicial authority is not compromised by unwarranted criticism or politicized debates. Upholding this provision preserves the balance between judicial accountability and the judiciary’s role as an impartial arbiter, while protecting the integrity and independence of judges to carry out their constitutional duties without fear of unjust scrutiny.

LIMITATION ON PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE:

Erskine May defines parliamentary privilege as “the sum of certain rights enjoyed by eah house collectively and by members of each house individually, without which they could not discharge their functions, and which exceed those possessed by their other bodies or individuals.”[11] Parliamentary privilege was introduced to prevent any undue interference in the working of the parliament and thereby enable the members of the parliament to function effectively and efficiently without unreasonable impediment.[12] In Sita Soren vs Union of India[13] the Supreme Court observed that parliamentary privileges are conferred by the Constitution to ensure that members can carry out their duties without interference. However, these privileges do not absolve members from the responsibilities that apply to all citizens. Members of Parliament are not above the law and are subject to the same legal standards as ordinary citizens, except when special considerations are necessary to protect the integrity of Parliament. The core principle is that all individuals, including parliamentarians, must be treated equally under the law. These privileges are applicable only when members are fulfilling their parliamentary roles and responsibilities. On the one hand, the parliamentary privileges of parliaments are absolutely neessary for the due execution of its powers and on the other hand, the privileges should not be used for the danger of the society and are subject to judicial review. An issue of parliamentary privileges arises when the court makes a member of Parliament or of a Parliamentary Committee liable in a civil or criminal action for what is stated in Parliament. The Article 121 restricts MPs from discussing the conduct of judges outside the impeachment process so that the MPs do not unfairly criticise judges via debates that will tarnish their reputation.

The Constitution of India specifies some privileges to the parliament.[14] The few parliamentary privileges are freedom of speech in parliament; immunity to a member from any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in parliament or any committee thereof;[15] immunity to a person from proceedings in any court in respect of the publication by or under theauthority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.[16] Courts are prohibited from inquiring into the validity of any proceedings in Parliament on the ground of an alleged irregularity of procedure.[17] No officer or Member of Parliament empowered to regulate procedure or the conduct of business or to maintain order in Parliament can be subject to a court’s jurisdiction in respect of exercise by him of those powers.[18] No person can be liable to any civil or criminal proceedings in any court for publication in a newspaper of a substantially true report of any proceedings of either House of Parliament unless the publication is proved to have been made with malice.[19]

The most important privilege of Members of Parliament is freedom of speech in Parliament. It is essential for the efficient discharge of their parliamentary duties, in the absence of which they may not be able to speak out their mind and express their views in the House without any fear. In the case M.S.M. Sharma vs State of Madras[20] popularly known as Searchlight case discussed the parliament privilege of freedom of speech and the freedom of speech of the press. The court held that the freedom of the press under Art. 19(1)(a) was subservient to and should yield to the Privileges under Art. 194(3).[21] But the court in passing, observed that if these privileges are codified, they become law under Art. 13 and they will be subject to judicial review. Under the current position of law, the harmonious construction theory still holds the field and the dice are loaded heavily in favour of parliamentary privileges and against Art. 19(1)(a).[22] Under Article 105(2) of the Constitution, the members have immunity to anything said in parliament even though it does not strictly pertain to the business before the House. The word ‘anything’ is of the widest import and is equivalent to ‘everything’. [23] The freedom of speech available to the members on the house of parliament is different from the freedom available to the citizens under Article 19(2). A law made under this article providing for reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech of the citizens would not circumscribe the freedom of speech of the members within the walls of the House.[24] While Article 105 grants MPs freedom of speech, Article 121 places a constitutional boundary to prevent potential abuse of this privilege. This ensures that the judiciary is safe from politically motivates or frivolous claims/criticism that could undermine its authority and independence.

Members enjoy complete protection even though the words uttered by them in the House are malicious and false to their knowledge.[25] Courts have no jurisdiction to take action against a member for his speech made in the House even if it amounts to contempt of the court.[26] The misuse of this immunity can have serious effects on the society who will otherwise seek the protection of the courts of law. The Committee of Privileges observed that a member of parliament does not enjoy unrestricted license of speech within the walls of parliament.[27] The committee observed that:

“It is against the rules of parliamentary debate and decorum to make defamatory statements or allegations of incriminatory nature against any person and the position is all the worse if such allegations are made against persons who are not in a position to defend themselves on the floor of the House. The privilege of freedom of speech can only be secured, if members do not abuse it.”[28]

It is also a breach of privilege to molest a Member or to take any action against him or to threaten him on account of anything said by him in Parliament or any Committee thereof.[29] Without Article 121, the conduct of judges could be questioned in open parliamentary sessions, where accusations even if unsubstantiated, might erode public confidence in the judiciary. The limitation ensures that allegations of judicial misconduct are handled through a formal, structured process that requires a motion for removal under Article 124(4), safeguarding the integrity of the judiciary.

In Justice (Retd.) Markhandey Katju vs Lok Sabha[30], a judge passes a comment in a public domain (about Mahatma Gandhi and Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, in the case at hand) and the parliament passed resolution as it deems fit. The supreme court held that it is well within the jurisdiction of the parliament to pass the resolutions and that the MPs have the full freedom for what they speak in the House.[31] Whereas, the bar in Art. 121 applies to discussion in Parliament but investigation and proof of misconduct or incapacity cannot exclude such discussion. This indicates that the machinery for investigation and proof must necessarily by outside parliament and not within it.[32] Therefore, the parliament comes into the picture only when a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehavior or incapacity has been proved. The speaker, who is a statutory authority is chosen as the process followed after proving the misconduct is parliamentary and the authority to make such a complaint is given to Members of Parliament.[33]

INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE:

As its integral constitutional structure, independence of the judiciary is an essential attribute of rule of law. Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist about the independence of judiciary that a complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.[34] The independence of the judiciary was adopted by the 7^th United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offendors.[35] The relevant basic principles are that the independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of the governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary. The term of office of Judges, their independence, security, adequate renumeration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall be adequately secured by law.[36] The judiciary is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the state within its limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. It stands between the citizen and the state as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive.

Therefore, it is absolutely essential that it is kept free and independent from all sorts of pressure and influence.[37] In High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and Another[38] the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“The concept of ‘judicial independence’ is a wider concept taking within its sweep independence from any pressure of prejudice. It has many dimensions, and is most essential to protect the liberty of citizens. In times of grave danger, it is the constitutional duty of the judiciary to poise the scales of justice unmoved by the powers undisturbed by the clamour of the multitude. The heart of the judicial independence is judicial individualism. The judiciary is not a disembodied abstraction. It is composed of individual persons who primarily work on their own.”[39]

The legislature is presumed not to legislate contrary to rule of law and therefore know that where disputes are to be adjudicated by a judicial body other than courts, its standards should approximately be the same as to what is expected of main stream judiciary.[40] Rule of Law can be meaningful only if there is an independent and impartial judiciary to render justice. Impartiality, independence, fairness and reasonableness in decision making are the hallmarks of Judiciary.[41] If `Impartiality’ is the soul of Judiciary, `Independence’ is the life blood of Judiciary. Independence is not the freedom for judges to do what they like. It is the independence of judicial thought.[42] The privilege given under the Article 121 advocates for the independence of judiciary and provides judicial privilege by imposing limits on parliamentary privilege. Judicial privilege is defined as a plea of absolute privilege that is available, for example, in respect of any statement made in the course of and with reference to judicial proceedings by any Judge, jurymen, party, witness or advocate. Such privilege is called ‘judicial privilege’ and “professional privilege.”[43] This privilege extends to all courts, superior or inferior, civil or revenue or military and all kinds of courts of justice acting judicially. It does not extend to administrative functions.[44] The essence of the rule of Absolute Privilege, therefore, is that the complaint must be addressed to a body which has judicial functions, or, quasi- judicial functions, and, the complaint must be a step in setting in motion judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.[45]

Judicial privilege can also be interpreted to mean that

“ Neither party, witness, counsel nor judge can be sued civilly for words spoken or written in the course of any proceeding before any court or tribunal recognised by law, and thus though the words written or spoken were written or spoken maliciously without any justification or excuse, and from personal illwill and anger against the person defamed.”[46]

It also added that “Absolute Privilege is defined as an excuse or immunity conferred by Law to a statement so that that no action can lie against it even though it falls under defamatory and might have been maliciously with improper motives. It is primarily related to Judges, Advocates and Witnesses in the course of legal proceedings and is also terms as Judicial Privilege.”[47]

The Judiciary needs to be free from any pressure in order to decide cases independently. For the same reason, the Constitution creates a structure to protect judges from being influenced by Parliament and the Executive. Therefore the Article 121 stipulates that the conduct of a Supreme Court or High Court judge cannot be discussed in Parliament unless it is for the purpose of presenting a motion for his removal.[48] The threat to the independence of judiciary becomes very real when a judge is allowed to be indicted and prosecuted for a crime stemming from a judicial act. The judicial privilege is grounded in judicial immunity and in a desire to promote the separation and independence of the judiciary from the branches of government. Three fundamental principles favour adoption of the privilege for the judiciary.[49] First, the functional operation of the judicial process requires that a judge be uninhibited in her communications with members of her staff; Second, judicial privilege finds support in the doctrine of judicial immunity, with which it is closely related; Third, the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers mandates that the judiciary be free from interference by the other branches of government.[50]

These three conditions deals with uninhibited communications for functional judicial operations, the doctrine of judicial immunity and the doctrine of separation of powers. The judges need to feel confident in discussing sensitive legal strategies without fearing the disclosure of these conversations as these fears would impair decision making and overall efficiency of the judiciary.[51] They are protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity which shields them from being held personally liable for actions taken in the course of their official duties. Judicial privilege extends this concept by protecting communications related to their judicial functions, preventing the possibility of legal challenges based on what judges discuss in their official capacity.[52] This immunity is drawn from the doctrine of separation of powers which supports independence by preventing interference or scrutiny by other branches of government.[53] If other branches were allowed to intrude on judicial communications, it could undermine the courts’ ability to operate impartially and independently, thus violating the separation of powers.[54] These principles align with the essence of Article 121 which prohibits discussions in Parliament regarding the conduct of judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, except when a motion of removal is under consideration.

IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGES:

To satisfy the need for judicial independence, the Framers created procedural safeguards that prevented the executive or the legislature from removing judges capriciously or without good cause.[55] The Constitution of India defines powers, delimits jurisdictions and demarcates the responsibilities of each organ. As regards the relationship between the parliament and the judiciary, both are under constitutional obligation not to encroach upon each other’s jurisdiction.[56] In this respect, Article 121 provides that the conduct of the Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court cannot be discussed in Parliament except upon a motion, for presenting to the President, praying for the removal of such Judge. Also, the matters which are sub judice cannot be discussed in Parliament. Article 122 provides that the Judiciary too cannot question the validity of any proceedings of Parliament on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.[57] The judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court may by writing to the President resign his office passed after an address by each House of Parliament in the prescribed manner.[58] Impeachment of a judge can be done only on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Therefore, a judge can be impeached only by the parliament and president when misbehaviour/misconduct is clearly established by various committees. And so, until the misbehaviour is established, the conduct cannot be discussed in the parliament thereby upholding the judicial independence.

In the Constituent Assembly Debates held on 24^th May, 1949 the process of removal of judges was discussed. It was observed that when the president and houses of parliament alone decide the removal of judges, it results in providing the legislature with very wide powers and also makes it difficult to prove the guilt of the judge.[59] But, the Article 121 provides judicial privileges by making it clear that the parliament can impeach a judge only when there is a proved misconduct and until proven, the same cannot be discussed in the Houses of Parliament. Shri Alladi Krishnaswami Iyer in the constituent assembly stated as follows:

“The general principle is laid down in the Constitution and later on the Federal law will provide for adequate machinery and that is the import of the clause”….. There is sufficient safeguard in the reference “proved misbehaviour” and we might make elabo- rate and adequate provision for the way in which ‘,he guilt could be brought home to a particular judge in any Federal law that may be passed but that is a different matter”…… “But I do not think that in a Constitution it is necessary to provide de- tailed machinery as to the impeachment, the charges to be framed against a particular judge. To make a detailed machinery for all these could be a novel procedure to be adopted in any Constitution.”[60]

So far, 6 judges have faced attempts to have them removed from office.[61] Justice V Ramaswami, then Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was the first judge to have impeachment proceedings against him in 1991. The Inquiry Committee had found him guilty on 11 out of 14 charges. But the impeachment motion failed as there were no sufficient votes supporting the impeachment.[62] Impeachment of Sikkim High Court Judge, PD Dinakaran was affirmed by the Inqiry Committee but he resigned his post claiming he had no confidence and faith in the impartiality of Inquiry Committee.[63] The impeachment of Justice Soumitra Sen of the Calcutta High Court was met with overwhelming support in the Rajya Sabha as she had misappropriated public funds. But she too resigned before motion was passed in Lok Sabha.[64] Later, the impeachment of JB Pardiwala, SK Gangele, V Nagarjuna Reddy were attempted but they did not materialise.[65]

Our Constitution contains checks and balances which require all the three wings to work harmoniously. It has created a separation of powersbetween all the three branches or wings though the separation, it is now well accepted, is not as rigid as it is under the American Constitution.[66] The legislature and the executive must act within their powers as declared by the Constitution and whenever they exceed their powers or jurisdiction, they can be corrected by the Judiciary. The Indian Judiciary’s powers of judicial review to declare Parliamentary and executive action ultra vires of the

Constitution has been recognized ever since 1950, when the Constitution came into force.[67] The fact that the Judiciary safeguards fundamental rights and the Constitution and can strike down any law or executive action that is contrary to the fundamental rights or other provisions of the Constitution does not, however, make the judiciary supreme. It too has to act within its powers and jurisdiction as envisaged by the Constitution.[68] The impeachment of judges, serves as a critical mechanism to ensure judicial accountability while safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. The Article 121 further supports this by restricting parliamentary discussions on judicial conduct unless connected to formal impeachment proceedings.

CONCLUSION:

Article 121 of the Indian Constitution plays an indispensable role in safeguarding the independence and integrity of the judiciary. By restricting parliamentary discussions on the conduct of judges to formal impeachment proceedings, it ensures that judges are shielded from unwarranted political interference and baseless criticisms. This provision upholds the principle of separation of powers, maintaining a clear boundary between the legislative and judicial branches. It ensures that any allegations of misconduct are addressed through a rigorous and structured process, preserving the judiciary’s impartiality and public confidence in its function.The rigorous impeachment process, further reinforces judicial accountability while protecting judges from capricious removal. The historical context and debates in the Constituent Assembly underline the importance of these safeguards in preventing the legislature from overstepping its bounds. Moreover, the concept of judicial privilege, rooted in judicial immunity and the doctrine of separation of powers, emphasizes the need for judges to operate without external pressures. This privilege ensures that judges can deliberate and communicate freely, essential for fair and independent decision-making. In conclusion, Article 121, forms a robust framework that balances judicial independence with accountability. It protects the judiciary from political encroachments, ensuring that judges can fulfill their constitutional duties with integrity and impartiality. This framework is vital for maintaining the rule of law and the democratic principles upon which the Indian Constitution is founded.

[1] Supreme Court of India vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481

[2] Ibid

[3] Article 121 of the Constitution of India, 1950; (Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/598239/)

[4] Article 121 of Indian Constitution: Restriction on Discussion in Parliament

(Source: https://constitutionsimplified.in/blog-post118)

[5] Kalpana Mehta vs Union of India (2018) 7 SCC 1

[6] C. Ravichandran Iyer vs Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee (1995) 5 SCC 457 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 953

[7] Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter), (2021) 3 SCC 160

[8] Bhaskar Shrachi Alloys Ltd. Vs Damodar Valley Corpn (2018) 8 SCC 281

[9] Sub Committee on Judicial Accountability etc vs Union of India and Ors., etc 1991 (4) SCC 699

[10] Sub Committee on Judicial Accountability etc vs Union of India and Ors., etc 1991 (4) SCC 699

(Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1581602/)

[11] Raja Ram Pal vs The Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors, AIR 2007 SC (SUPP) 1448

[12] Supra nt. 5

[13] Sita Soren vs Union of India, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 229

[14] Chapter- 8; Parliamentary Privileges (14^th September 14, 2024, 11:23am;

Source: https://cms.rajyasabha.nic.in/UploadedFiles/Procedure/RajyaSabhaAtWork/English/244-310/CHAPTER8.pdf)

[15] Art. 105 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[16] Ibid

[17] Article 122 (1) of the Constitution of India, 1950

[18] Article 122 (2) of the Constitution of India, 1950

[19] Article 361A of the Constitution of India, 1950

[20] M.S.M. Sharma vs Srikrishna Sinha, AIR 1959 SC 395

[21] Global Freedom of Expression, Columbia University, MSM Sharma vs Krishna Sinha

(Source: https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/m-s-m-sharma-v-krishna-sinha/)

[22] National School of Law of India Review, The Conflict between Freedom of the Press and Parliamentary Privileges:

An unfamiliar twist in a familiar tale. (Source: http://docs.manupatra.in/newsline/articles.pdf)

[23] Supra nt. 14

[24] Supra nt. 20

[25] Suresh Chandra Banerji vs Punit Goala, AIR 1951 Calcutta 176

[26] Surendra Mohanty vs Nabakrishna Choudhury, AIR 1958 Orissa 168

[27] Supra nt. 14

[28]Ibid

[29] Parliamentary Privileges by Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi

(Source: https://cms.rajyasabha.nic.in/UploadedFiles/ElectronicPublications/Parliamentary_Privileges_2022.pdf

[30] Markhandey Katju vs Lok Sabha AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 1379

[31] Supra nt 8

[32] Supra nt. 9

[33] P.D. Dinakaran vs Judges Inquiry Committee (2011) 8 SCC 474; K.S. Puttaswamy vs Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1

[34] Ibid

[35] Ibid

[36] Madras Bar Association vs Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1

[37] Supra nt. 6

[38] Ibid

[39] High Court of Judicature at Bombay vs Shirishkumar Rangrao Patil and Another (1997) 6 SUPREME COURT 339

[40] Union of India vs R. Gandhi (2010) 11 SCC 1

[41] Union of India vs Sankalchand Himatal Sheth, 1977 (4) SCC 193

[42] Chandra Mohan vs State of UP, AIR 1966 SC 1987

[43] Pandey Surendra Nath Sinha And Anr vs Bageshwari Pd, AIR 1961 PATNA 164

[44] Sh. Jasbir Singh vs Smt. Ravinder Kaur @ Renu, CS No. 251/2012

[45] Brig. B.C. Rana (Retd.) vs Ms. Seema Katoch & Ors CS (OS) 503/ 2009

[46] Shri Kuldeep Singh S/O Late Shri Karam Singh vs Shri Harinder Singh S/O Shri Kuldeep Singh, CS No: 0632/04

[47] Ashok Kumar vs Radha Kishan Vij & Ors, 1983 (1) R.C.R.(Criminal) 321

[48] Parliament and the Judiciary: Background note for the conference on effective legislatures

(Source: https://prsindia.org/files/parliament/discussion_papers/Parliamentjudiciary.pdf)

[49] Ibid

[50] Robert S. Catz and Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, Georgia Law Review

(Source: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/geolr22&i=99

[51] The University of Pennsylvania Law Review, The Law Clerk’s Duty of Confidentiality

(Source: https://doi.org/10.2307/3311954)

[52] Floyd vs Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (S.C. 1608)

[53] United States vs Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217-18 (1980)

[54] Northern Pipeline Construction Co. Vs Marathon Pipe Line Co, 458 U.S. 50 (1982)

[55] Kevin C. Milne, The Doctrine of Judicial Privilege: The Historical and Constitutional Basis Supporting a Privilege for the Federal Judiciary, Washington and Lee Law Review;

(Source: https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/waslee44&i=225)

[56] Ibid

[57] Impeachment of Judges by the Lok Sabha Secretariat New Delhi

(Source: https://loksabhadocs.nic.in/Refinput/New_Reference_Notes/English/ImpeachmentofJudges.pdf)

[58] Article 124 and Article 217 of the Constitution of India, 1950

[59] Constituent Assembly Debates on 24^th May 1949, Part II (Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/798115/)

[60] Supra nt. 10

[61] Impeachment of Judges: A rigorous process and a history of fruitless attempts, Bar and Bench

(Source: https://www.barandbench.com/columns/impeachment-judges-rigorous-process)

[62] Number of Times Impeachment proceedings were initiated against a SC or HC Judge by Supreme Court Observer

(Source: https://www.scobserver.in/journal/number-of-times-impeachment-proceedings-were-initiated-against-a-supreme-court-or-high-court-judge/)

[63] Justice PD Dinakaran vs Hon’ble Judges Inquiry Committee & Ors, AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 3711