Vacuum in Caucasus

By – Samvat Bhardwaj

The modern day conflict in the Nagorno Karabakh (or Artsakh for Armenia) region has become a staging ground for proxy war, introduction of newer military tactics and a battlespace for global powers to influence each other by the application of covert forces nestled in the caucasian mountain ranges. The militant ethno-religious context of the caucasus however suggests to us that tensions in this region aren’t as fresh as they may seem. In the current setting of things there is a perceived frustration from Armenia due to the inability of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and Armenia’s main security guarantor, the Russian Federation being unable to assist much materially due to its war on Ukraine. This has allowed for the development of a vacuum which tactically will suit the interests of Azerbaijan if another round of clashes were to break out. 

History and Demography 

The ri between Armeniun and Azeris extends as far back as the Ottomans. The modern day Armenian people trace their direct lineage back to early Greeks and eastern europeans. Linguistically they are distinct from even their Georgian cousins in the neighborhood. Their religious practices however are mostly confined to the broader eastern orthodoxy. The Azeris on the other hand are Turkic (turanic) people who originally came from central asia post the reduction in immanence of the Chagatai Khanate. A unique distinction from the other strands of the Khanate is that the Azeris today are predominantly Shia, having been very much influenced by Persia over the centuries. 

This region in South East Europe has hence been the battleground for influence between the various powers of the region. The tension around Nagorno Karabakh persisted since before the USSR. However inducements and incentives from Moscow always made sure that the local issues in the individual socialist republics never got enough visibility to escalate into a conflict. 

Under the USSR, Nagorno Karabakh, was given under the administration of Azerbaijan, however the fact of its ethnic composition being Armenian was duly considered. This administrative setup gave the modern day Azerbaijan legitimacy to claim Nagorno Karabakh as their own under the “successor state” principle. The underlying tension however never got formally addressed in any arbitration. This stood in direct opposition to the vote from Nagorno Karabakh’s legislature to amalgamate with Armenia. 

Violence had begun for Nagorno Karabakh as early as 1988 and large-scale combat operations started in 1991 immediately post the fall of the Soviet Union. The ‘88 clashes ended with a broadly Armenia success, where it got control over Artsakh, in a deal brokered by Russia. There were clashes along similar lines, geographies and players again in 2016, 2020 and 2023.

Nagorno Karabakh/Artsakh 

The conflict has been very much centred around and for, what the Azeris call Nagorno Karabakh and the Armenians call Artsakh. Also in contention are the seven surrounding districts which have been under de facto control of the self declared “Republic of Artsakh”. From a sovereignty perspective, international recognition finds Nagorno Karabakh as a de jure part of Azerbaijan. It has been the position of Azerbaijan to take back control of the territories of Nagorno Karabakh from the self declared republic along with an unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces and assets in the region. 

Turkey: Reclamation of the Ottoman 

The Turks have always been receptive to the Azeri cause. The struggle and conflict further plays perfectly into President Erdogan’s plans for projection power and influence and being a regional if not continental superpower. Turkey’s aid to Azerbaijan hinges on the following principles: “Consolidation of its independence, preservation of its territorial integrity and realizing its economic potential”. Azerbaijan’s access to the natural resources of the Caspian sea allows it to play “oil and energy game” in its favour. 

Turkey’s extensive military integration and aid allows Azerbaijan to field a competent fighting force. This defence relationship is exceptionally close, very similar to the USA and Japan relationship. Turkey has also oen lent out newer combat technologies like drones and radar systems, gathered data on its battlefield performance and then improved and fine-tuned it. In 2020 there were also unconfirmed reports of the Turks hiring Syrian mercenaries and placing them under Azeri command to deploy. 

Russia: Absence and vulnerability 

In this conflict the conduct of the Russian Federation invites intrigue, confusion and frustration from both belligerents. It has bilateral ties with both the nations and even extends security guarantees to them through the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The CSTO can be understood as a post soviet union of grouping of former republics under the USSR with similar objectives to the NATO. The principal security guarantor here being the Russian Federation. Its members include Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. This security guarantee however doesn’t help Armenia as Russia finds itself unable to assist Armenia on territory that is internationally recognized to be under Azerbaijan. This feature however doesn’t stop Russia from selling arms to both sides. The Russian military though is on better footing in terms of joint operability with the Armenians. However, for as long as large-scale combat stays within the disputed region Russian neutrality is unlikely to be disturbed. 

Another disturbance to Russian neutrality may be brought about if the Turks continue to exert greater influence in the conflict. In the short to medium term, Russian aggression still seems highly unlikely due to its adventures in Ukraine. The Russian absence hence creates a disparity and a vacuum. This is the express reason why Armenia might grow disillusioned with the CSTO system and the limitations with the Russian security umbrella. In a continued status quo of this sort Armenia may find itself desperate and ever more reliant on partners like India. 

India: possible augmentation in Russia’s Stead 

For diplomatic and strategic reasons, India finds itself backing Armenia with exceptionally high integration, second to only perhaps with Russia. Even though on principled grounds of international law India’s situation in Kashmir is very similar to that of Azerbaijan, India finds itself supporting Armenia. This could originally be attributed to the support Turkey and Pakistan gave to Azerbaijan. Pakistan’s involvement in the conflict however stays very limited, usually following Turkic lead. Islamabad’s key interest is that of energy and the notion of being perceived as the leader among the Islamic nations of the world or the umma. India extends its security umbrella through access to its indigenously produced weapon platforms, armaments and technology to Armenia. Armenia is oen found being the only foreign buyer for many indigenous India artillery systems, radars and air defence systems, military technology and the ever looming negotiation around the cruise missile program. 

Indian recent actions in the region suggest a growing inkling to establish a foothold in the caucasus as well to control the influence that its strategic adversaries may have in the region.

Indian dependence on Azeris energy exports is limited allowing for a greater flexibility of action. The strategic proximity to Aremia has not come at the cost of its engagement with Azerbaijan on diplomatic and trade fronts. Through economic easements and infrastructure projects however, India is firmly placing its weight behind Armenia. 

Regardless of the above, India will never find itself kinetically involved in the conflict. Not only does it find the USA in the opposite camp, it also finds Israel. The USA will mostly defer to Turkey as the NATO power in the region for regional matters. While the Israelis find it in their best interest to have Azerbaijan placated for their access to Iran and ease of operation Israeli intelligence gets in Azerbaijan. 

Armenian Disillusionment 

In the 2023 escalation by Azerbaijan, Armenia found itself unable to tactically match the challenge through traditional means. Meanwhile its principal security guarantor, the Russian Federation, was also unable to do much to prevent the large-scale exodus of ethnic Armenians from Artsakh as a result of the Azeri movement. A ceasefire that followed the 2023 offensive, persists to the time of writing this article (December 2024). 

The acceptance of realities pushed Armenia to limit tactical engagements, retreat from indefensible positions and approach the diplomatic table. In October 2024, Aremia further asserted movement out of the Russian security umbrella by negotiating a transfer-of-guard at its borders with Turkey and Iran. These borders, previously manned by Russia, will for the first time in three decades be manned by Armenian forces post a transition set to start on January 1st 2025. 

Conclusion 

Armenia will be negotiating from a somewhat disadvantaged position going forward. It has limited tactical capabilities for offence against Azerbaijan unless a significant battlefield innovation causes disruption or another security guarantor backs Armenia both militarily or diplomatically. In interpretation from the book “Black Garden” by Thomas De Waal, the current status quo was prepared for the Armenians. The attrition nature of the Russia-Ukraine war and an overtly projecting Turkic foreign policy were two variables that coincided with fatal perfection creating a strategic dilemma for Armenia and a vacuum in the caucasus. 

References 

● The surprising Armenia-Azerbaijan peace deal over Nagorno-Karabakh, explained ● The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict hints at the future of war 

● World Report 2024: Armenia | Human Rights Watch 

● Nagorno-Karabakh Control Map & Timeline: Artsakh Withdrawals – December 1, 2020 ● De Waal, T. (2003). Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York University Press 

● Carreteras y ferrocarriles por la paz en el Cáucaso: el plan de Armenia para convertirse en una confluencia de rutas | Internacional | EL PAÍS 

● Armenia hopes to sign peace articles with Azerbaijan within a month, president says | Reuters ● Black Garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *