By – Samvat Bhardwaj
To understand the current paradigm in South Korea we are to properly and coherently characterize the political, social and legal context in the sub continent that have perhaps brought us here. This article will not attempt to theorize what may have caused the attempt by President Yoon Suk Yeol rather the intersectional constructs that may have allowed for something like this to be possible.
Korea: The Republic, the stronghold and the original Asian Marvel
Modern Korean history begins post world war two, when the Allied powers, upon accepting Japan’s Instrument of Surrender from His Majesty The Emperor, begin the process of occupation, demilitarization and influencing of the “liberated” areas. In Korea’s context this meant the major regional stakeholders, USSR and the US. From 1910 to 1945 the Peninsula was under direct Imperial control and post that USA and USSR agreed to, with reasonable amicability (initially), divide the Peninsula in their own spheres of influence along the thirty eighth parallel (38 degrees North).
The War
A clear ideological and security point of friction emerged between the two Koreas. Communist North had significant backing from Mao’s People’s Republic of China and the USSR, while the South was in the American sphere. At this point in history North Korea was considered more of a success, having greater access to natural resources, industry and agriculture. The South enjoyed American influence and support but initially seems to have suffered from America’s
post ‘45 decrease in military spending and the greater attention placed on the rebuilding of Europe (Marshall Plan).
In 1950, afier a considerable time of small skirmishes and minor incidents, North Korea invaded the South under the advice and support of the USSR and PRC. The United Nations joined in with the United States to prosecute a counter attack and restore peace. For those interested in India’s contributions, please look into the actions of the 60th Parachute Field Ambulance who were acting under the United Nations coalition.
By June, 1953 the shooting war had come to an end, and an armistice had been declared under the Military Armistice Commission (belligerent states), a Neutral Nations Commission Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia), and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (the same four states, plus India as the custodian of the POWs). The de facto border between the North and South was agreed upon at the 38th parallel along a line called the Demilitarized Zone. The US continues to hold its troops on this border to this day.
The War etched a trauma and an ever looming threat in the consciousness of the South Korean people. Two realities were made clear to the people of South Korea: The absolute carnage and destruction the North was capable of, and how intimately vulnerable was the South’s seat of power in Seoul if any major thrust were to take place across the border. In terms of security and insurance against the North, South Korea finds the US, treaty bound to come to her defence if an act of aggression were to cause a legitimate threat. These treaty bound assurance is the exact same that the US extends to its non NATO allies in the Pacific like Japan, Guam, Philippines, Taiwan and Australia.
The above characterization explains or is the provided reasoning behind many policies that South took up in defence, economics, industry, urban planning and even architecture.
Post
By the time the US started to shifi manufacturing outside and deindustrialize in the 80s, her allies in Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan were going through industrial revolutions of their own. If you would recall, agriculture and command economy had kept the North as the success
story of the peninsula. This quickly changed in the information age and with democracy. South Korean labour was competitive in most spheres, the industrial apparatus through the South Korean Chaebols was ready to take on low to moderately technical manufacturing and services. If one wants to look into how the South Korea flavor of corruption looks like, one may look further into the relation between the Blue Palace and Chaebols.
Democracy came to the Republic of South Korea in 1986.
Hiccups with Democracy
From the most recent, pre martial law assessments of President Yoon’s government, his approval ratings were projected at an all time low, labour market was seen to be too saturated in some sectors while some sectors faced unique challenges symmetric to the American economy with none of the accompanying benefits. This was particularly a dulling moment for President Yoon who had built this reputation on a career as a prosecutor going afier public corruption.
Politically, President Yoon’s party was brought in on a fickle majority wherein his party did not have the favour of the people and the majority in the parliament. President Yoon, hence, could simply not get agendas cleared, bills passed, facing constant torpedoing with an objectively uncooperating opposition. The President’s fiscal austerity bill got shot down hard earlier in the news cycle, acting as perhaps the last straw for Yoon.
In the 2024 election Yoon’s mandate faced further reduction in the Parliament reducing him to a “lame duck” President. The opposition hold a hundred and ninety two out of three hundred seats in the parliament. Yoon’s margin by which he retained his Presidency was a Westminster generous 0.6%. On the other hand the opposition has been able to unite and get bills passed with relative ease, which then get shot down by the Executive (President) and are not getting implemented. The Presidential veto was liberally used in these situations.
For better context the elections in South Korea happen in a similar manner to that of the French, where the President is elected in one election and directly, and the Parliament is elected in another.
At this point the corruption scandals involving his wife did not particularly help his cause. The First Lady was accused of stock manipulation, insider trading and accepting gifis in return for favor from her husband’s regime.
Regimes of Martial law, for the South Korean people, were a very common occurrence until democracy took spring in the 80s. Of the 16 attempts at martial law, most came with the same reasoning and warning similar to the one this time from Yoon: Threat from the Communist northerners. The historic taste of martial law regimes among the Korean people reminds them of political imprisonment, false trials, kidnappings, murders, etc. This hence might be the reason, an aggressive pushback was observed from not just the elected representatives but also the everyday person. Certainly the constitution mandating parliamentary approval for martial law gave legal legitimacy for the hyper aggressive pushback.
Conclusions and learnings for the Indian observer
A very active, assertive and self assured people are required to push back against degradation of freedoms of this sort. The will, morale and morals of the South Korean people were strong enough that even Yoon’s party members voted against the martial law. The Army and the local Police will be tried in the court of public opinion for their involvement in the application of martial law.
If one were to war game a scenario for India, a very different picture might be brought forward. The Indian people and the Indian Army do not have tolerance for blatant degradation of democracy of this sort. India has never been under direct martial law and instances where martial law was imposed were times of genuine all out war.
However, like we saw with Mrs Gandhi’s little rendezvous in ‘75, a supposed PM doesn’t need the Army or Police to collaborate. The General Emergency was structured also as a tool against possible coup d’etats where the Army might try to overthrow a government. This fear was made stronger over the years by what happened over the years in Pakistan and Bangladesh. To act as the Government’s enforcers, Central Armed Paramilitary Forces exist directly under the Ministry of Home Affairs which in times of Emergency will be taking their orders directly from the Prime Minister’s Office. It could be very much possible that in such a scenario even if the
Army were to not collaborate, it could be easily confined to barracks or at least the New Delhi and Army Headquarters would be flooded by Home Affairs’ personnel.
All this considering, a similar incident seems highly unlikely in the Indian context, not because of the legal, structural stopgaps against it or inability of the State to exert force through violence beyond a certain point, but by the sheer fact that the people of this Realm & Republic would not be amicable to such an arrangement. No matter how popular or loved the hypothetical leader might be.
India’s investments and trust in institutions and not individuals is what allows it to practice its way of life and claim its destiny.
About the Author
Samvat Bhardwaj is an economics and international affairs student with the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy. His research interests include Defence, National Security, Macroeconomics and Public Policy.